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ZACHARY A. SMITH*

Centralized Decisionmaking in the
Administration of Groundwater
Rights: The Experience of Arizona,
California and New Mexico and
Suggestions for the Future
Groundwater law in the western states has evolved during the 20th
century' from the English or common law rule of absolute ownership 2 to
the American rule of reasonable use3 and correlative right4 to the doctrine
*Assistant Professor, Social Sciences Division, University of Hawaii, Hilo. B.A. 1976, California
State University, Fullerton, M.A. 1979, Ph.D. 1984, University of California, Santa Barbara. The
research for this article was done, in part, with the support of a grant from the Los Alamos Scientific
Laboratory, New Mexico.
1. For a discussion of the history of the development of western groundwater laws see Clark,
Ground Water Legislation in the Light of Experience in the Western States, 22 MONT. L. REV. 42
(1960); Hutchins, Trends in the Statutory Law of Ground Water in the Western States, 34 TEX. L.
REV. 157 (1955).
2. The common law or absolute ownership doctrine holds that the water beneath one's land is
the property of the landowner and absent malice may be withdrawn without regard to the effect such
withdrawals may have on adjacent landowners. Developed in relatively wet England and transferred
to the relatively wet East coast, the absolute ownership doctrine worked reasonably well in those
parts of the country. Absent competition for groundwater supplies or shortages in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries, and being familiar with water law in other parts of the country, many
courts and legislatures adopted the common law rule. (See, e.g., Vineland Irr. Dist. v. Azusa Irr.
Co., 126 Cal. 486, 58 P. 1057 (1899); Hanson v. McCue, 42 Cal. 303 (1871); Mosier v. Caldwell,
7 Nev. 363 (1872); Vanderwork v. Hewes, 15 N.M. 439, 110 P. 567 (1910); Metcalf v. Nelson, 8
S.D. 87, 65 N.W. 911 (1895); Houston & Tex. Cent. R.R. v. East, 98 Tex. 146, 81 S.W. 279
(1904); Herriman Irr. Co. v. Keel, 25 Utah 96, 69 P. 719 (1902); Hunt v. City of Laramie, 26 Wyo.
160, 181 P. 137 (1919); Terr. Okla. Stat. § 4162 (1890). It was not long, however, before the
drawbacks of the absolute ownership doctrine, particularly in ard states, became apparent and various
modifications of the rule were developed.
3. The reasonable use doctrine, or American rule, was the modification made by many courts to
the absolute ownership doctrine. (See, e.g., Maricopa v. Southwest Cotton Co., 39 Ariz. 65, 4 P.2d
369 (1931); Volkmann v. Crosby, 120 N.W.2d 18 (N.D. 1963); Canada v. City of Shawnee, 179
Okla. 53, 64 P.2d 694 (1937); Bull v. Siegrist, 169 Or. 180, 129 P.2d 832 (1942); Home v. UtahOil refining Co., 59 Utah 279, 202 P. 815 (1921); Evans v. City of Seattle, 182 Wash., 450, 47
P.2d 984 (1935); Binning v. Miller, 55 Wyo. 451, 102 P.2d 54 (1940). Basically, reasonable use
doctrine limits a landowner's right to use of water beneath his land to an amount necessary for some
reasonable, beneficial purpose on his land. Waste of water or transport to distant lands is not
considered a reasonable beneficial use when such use interferes with the right of adjacent landowners
to use the water beneath their own lands for the beneficial use of those lands.
4. Similar in application to the reasonable use doctrine, the correlative rights doctrine recognizes
the landowner's right to use water beneath his lands, but tempers that right by providing that
landowners overlying a common source of groundwater have equal or correlative rights to a reasonable
amount of the water when applied to a reasonable beneficial use on the land overlying the groundwater
basin. See, e.g., Katz v. Walkinshaw, 141 Cal. 116, 74 P. 766 (1903).
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appropriation. 5

of prior
Currently most western states have adopted the
prior appropriation doctrine and issue permits for the extraction of
groundwater6 and several states have established permit systems under
other doctrines. Although a number of states have established local boards
or districts with varying responsibilities over groundwater matters,8 permit
systems are usually centrally administered by a state official (often a state
engineer), state board or commission.
Two notable exceptions to this trend, however, are California and
Texas. Both states are heavy users and overdrafters of groundwater and
have resisted attempts to centralize control over groundwater extractions.'
This resistance has, in large part, been due to a fear that drilling and
extraction decisions, if made by a state or local water agency under some
type of a permit system, would prove disadvantageous to groundwater
pumpers.1" Current and future extractors are understandably reluctant to
see a water rights system they have relied upon changed-particularly
when that reliance may have led them to invest in land and equipment.
The fears of groundwater extractors that a change to prior appropriation
or some other permit system for determining groundwater rights will
result in decreased extraction may not be well founded-at least if the
experience of other states can be used as a guide. In a number of states
with prior appropriation or other permit systems, overdrafting and the
5. In states that follow the prior appropriation doctrine the first appropriator of water, by putting
water to a beneficial use, without waste, has a right to continue that use. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT.
§46.15.010-.270 (1966); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§37-90-102 and 37-92-101 (1973 & Supp
1980); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 42-226; KAN. STAT. § 82a-703 (1977); NEV. REV. STAT. § 534.020
(1973); N. MEX. STAT. ANN. § 75-11-1 (1978); N.D. CENT. CODE, §61-01-01 (1960 & Supp.
1975); OKLA. STAT. ANN., tit. 82 § 1020.1 (Cum. Supp. 1976); ORE. REV. STAT. § 537.505
(1979); S. DAK. COMP. LAWS § 46-6-3 (Supp. 1979); UTAH CODEANN. § 73-3-1 (1968); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. §90.44.010-.250 (1962); WYO. STAT. ANN. §41-144 (Supp. 1975).
6. ALASKA STAT. §46.15.040 (1966); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §37-90-137 (1973); ID.
CODE ANN. § 42-226 (Comm. Supp. 1976); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-707 (1977); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 534.050 (1973); N. MEX. STAT. ANN. § 72-12-3 (1978); N. DAK. CENT. CODE § 6101-01 (1960 & Supp. 1975); OKLA. STAT. ANN. §82-1020.7 (Cum. Supp. 1976); ORE. REV.
STAT. § 537.535 (1979); UTAH CODEANN. § 73-3-1 (1968); WASH. REV. CODEANN. §90.44.050
(1962); WYO. STAT. ANN. §41-138 (1959).
7. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN., tit. 45, § 513-519 (Supp. 1981-1982); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 17722 to 29 (1968); MONT. REV. CODES § 89-880 to 888 (Supp. 1975).
8. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-103, 37-90-118 to 37-90-135 (1973); ID. CODE ANN.
§42-237d (Cum. Supp. 1976); KAN. REV. STAT. § 82a-1020 (1977); NEV. REV. STAT. § 46-658
(Cum. Supp. 1976); NEV. REV. STAT. § 534.035 (1973); N. MEX. STAT. ANN. § 72-14-1 (1978);
UTAH CODE ANN. §73-7-1 (1968); WYO. STAT. ANN. §41-130 (1959).
9. See Johnson, Texas GroundwaterLaw: A Survey and Some Proposals,22 NAT. RES. J. 1017
(1982); California Water Resources Center, Proceedings of the Thirtieth Biennial Conference on
Ground Water, at 46-52 (1981).
10. Id., and Gardner, Howitt and Nuckton, The Casefor Regional GroundwaterManagement,
35 CALIF. AGRIC. 1 and 2 (1981) 9-10.
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number of new wells put into production has not declined. New Mexico
is an example of such a state."
This fact raises an interesting question concerning the attitudes of
groundwater pumpers toward the centralized administration of groundwater rights on the state level. Specifically, is it centralized administration
some groundwater pumpers fear or the possibility of losing present and
possibily future rights to pump groundwater? This study is an attempt to
answer this question by summarizing the groundwater law and administrative systems in Arizona, California, and New Mexico and by ascertaining the attitudes of groundwater pumpers (as represented by the opinions
of interest group leaders active in groundwater matters) toward centralized
control and administration of groundwater allocation decisions on the
state level.' 2
Arizona, California, and New Mexico are good candidates for this type
of comparison because of the differences in their groundwater laws and
current level of centralized statewide control over groundwater pumping.
New Mexico is an example of a state with a long (in terms of groundwater)
history of experience with a prior appropriation and permit system administered in the Office of the State Engineer. California has had even
longer experience with the correlative rights doctrine and no centralized
control over groundwater use on the state level. Arizona is a reasonableuse doctrine state that only recently passed a groundwater management
act vesting significant powers over groundwater use (in the most heavily
used groundwater basins) in a department of water resources. As such,
the three states represent three different legal and administrative ground11. As discussed later in the paper, New Mexico has had a long history of a centralized groundwater
rights system controlled via a permit system administered by the New Mexico State Engineer.
However, from 1970 to 1975 alone, the use of groundwater in New Mexico increased by 12 percent,
and in 1970 statewide overdraft was estimated at approximately 719,000 acre-feet annually. Water
Quality Control Commission, New Mexico, State of New Mexico Water Quality Status Summary
(1980); Bureau of Reclamation, U.S. Dept. of Interior, New Mexico Water Resources Assessmewnt
for Planning Purposes (1976).
12. Groups and group leaders interviewed for this study were identified on the basis of their
reputations. Individuals within state water agencies known to have been"active in the past in groundwater management, conflicts or litigation were asked to identify groups and individuals that have
also been active in the past in groundwater matters. The attitudes of the following groups are
summarized in this study. They represent the major and most important groundwater users in their
states. In Arizona the groups were the Agri-Business Council of Arizona; the Arizona Mining
Association; and the League of Arizona Cities and Towns. In California, the California Cattlemen's
Association; the California Chamber of Commerce; the California Farm Bureau; and the Association
of California Water Agencies. In New Mexico, the New Mexico Cattle Grower's Association; the
New Mexico Farm Bureau; the New Mexico Mining Association; the New Mexico Oil and Gas
Association; and the Public Service Company of New Mexico. The individuals within these organizations are not identified as confidentiality was promised in return, it was hoped, for candor.
Interviews were conducted during the month of December 1981 in Arizona and March and May
1982 in California and New Mexico respectively.
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water environments. Those administrative environments and the groundwater laws of the three states are summarized below, followed by the
opinions of interest groups representing major groundwater pumpers in
Arizona, California and New Mexico toward differing types of administrative arrangements.
ARIZONA GROUNDWATER LAW
Arizona recognizes three classes of water supply: surface water, water
flowing in definite underground channels, and percolating groundwater.
Surface water and water flowing in definite underground channels are
considered public property and governed by the doctrine of prior appropriation.' 3 Percolating groundwater is governed by the rule of reasonable
use.
This section will summarize the major court decisions that have established the reasonable use doctrine as the groundwater law in Arizona.
Several commissions, beginning in 1938, have examined Arizona groundwater law and made recommendations for changes in the Arizona Code.
Many of these recommendations would have centralized control over
groundwater pumping at the state level.
Groundwater was not mentioned in the Howell Code of 1864, Arizona's
Territorial Constitution. 14 The Arizona Supreme Court in 1904 in Howard
v. Perrin5 first recognized that percolating groundwater is not public
water subject to the doctrine of prior appropriation. With the exception
of a brief period between January 1952 and March 195316 the Arizona
Supreme Court has maintained this position consistent with Howard.
In 1926 in Pima Farmsv: Proctor,7 the court maintained the distinction
between percolating water and water flowing-in definite underground
channels but found a definite underground channel could include, as in
this case, water not within clearly defined banks or channels. Although
the court found that the subterranean stream in question ". . . flows within
well-defined and known channels, the course of which can be distinctly
traced," 18 the nature of this underground stream was such that, as one
13. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-131.
14. D. MANN, THE POLITICS OF WATER IN ARIZONA 44 (1963).
15. 8 Arizona 347, 76 P. 460 (1904).
16. On 12 January 1952, in Bristor v. Cheatham (73 Arizona 228, 240 P.2d 185), the court, by
a 3-2 margin, found groundwater to be public property subject to prior appropriation. On 14 March
1953, the court reversed itself and, again in a 3-2 decision, reapproved the doctrine of private
ownership subject to reasonable use in Bristor v. Cheatham, 75 Arizona 227, 255 P.2d 173 (1953).
17. 30 Arizona 96, 245 P. 369 (1926).
18. Id.
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commentator noted, " [t]he description would fit most of the rivers of the
9
state and would include most of the groundwater supplies."
Any confusion that resulted from the Pima decision was ameliorated
somewhat five years later when the court decided Maricopa County Mu2
nicipal Water Conservation District v. Southwest Cotton Co. et al. " In
Maricopa, the court again reaffirmed the distinction between underground
streams and percolating groundwater and found there is a presumption
that groundwater is not part of an underground stream. The court further
found that the burden of rebutting that presumption belonged to the party
seeking to establish the existence of such a stream. The court noted:
According to the great weight of authority the essential characteristics
of a water course are a channel, consisting of well-defined bed and
banks, and a current of water ... without all these characteristics
there can be no water course. 2'
In a series of cases decided after Maricopa, the court decided that 22a
spring that did not naturally surface was not subject to appropriation;
artesian water was not subject to appropriation, absent proof the water
had as its origin an underground stream; 23 and upheld the State Water
Code's 1921 inclusion of surface springs as subject to appropriation. 24
Hence, with the exception of the brief period mentioned above, percolating groundwater has been, and continues to be, considered the property of the owner of the overlying land subject to requirements of reasonable
use. This body of law has not resulted in the most efficient management
and utilization of groundwater resources in Arizona. Several problems,
notably overdrafting, became apparent in the 1930s and resulted in the
formation of groundwater study commissions to recommend possible
solutions to the legislature.
The first groundwater study commission was appointed by Governor
Rawghlie C. Stanford in 1938.1 Although unable to agree on measures
to recommend to the legislature, the commission found a need for further
study of the state's groundwater resources and recommended the appropriation of funds to aid the United States Geological Survey (USGS) in
conducting a study. In 1939, the funds were appropriated, and in 1943,
19. G. Smith, Groundwater Law in Arizona and Neighboring States, AAES TECH. BULL. No.
65, 1936 quoted in D. MANN, supra note 14, at 46-47.
20. 39 Arizona 65, 4 P. 369 (1931).
21. Id., 39 Arizona 65, 85, 4 P. 369, 376 (1931).
22. Fourzman v. Curtis, 43 Arizona 140, 29 P.2d 722 (1934).
23. Campbell v. Willard, 45 Arizona 221, 42 P.2d 403 (1935).
24. Parker et. al. v. McIntyre et. al., 47 Arizona 484, 56 P.2d 1337 (1936).
25. Ariz. Groundwater Mgmt. Study Comm'n, Draft Report of Tentative Recommendations, July
1979, at 1-6 [hereinafter cited as 1979 Draft Recommendations].
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the USGS produced a preliminary report that concluded, inter alia, there
was a significant need for a groundwater code that would protect groundwater basins from overdrafting.2 6
During the early 1940s, several attempts were made in the legislature
to appropriate additional funds for studying the state's groundwater problems and developing a groundwater code. None of these attempts was
successful.27 In 1945, the situation changed. The Bureau of Reclamation
had found the Central Arizona Project to be feasible economically and
technically but warned that approval of the project would not be made
unless the state passed a groundwater code that addressed the overdraft
problem. 8 In a special session called for the purpose, the legislature
passed the Ground Water Act of 1945.29
The act required well registration and the reporting to the state land
commissioner of various data concerning well extractions, construction
and utilization.3 The act was basically a vehicle for providing information
and did not have a significant impact on overdrafting. 31
In 1946, the USGS issued a report finding increased overdraft in central
Arizona. 32 As agricultural production expanded after the war, conditions
of overdraft increased. In 1948, the Secretary of the Interior warned that
the Central Arizona Project would not be constructed absent a groundwater
management plan that would control overdraft. 33 The same year the legislature passed the Ground Water Act of 1948. 34
This act provided for the declaration by the state land commissioner
of "critical groundwater areas" in "any groundwater basin ...not having
sufficient groundwater to provide a reasonably safe supply for irrigation
of the cultivated lands in the basin at the then current rates of withdrawal." ' 35 Upon declaration of a basin as critical, further expansion of
agricultural irrigation by drilling new wells was prohibited. The act did
not apply to water used for domestic supply, for industry, for transportation, or for stock watering.36
Hence, within critical basins, overdrafting was not reversed but merely
frozen at current levels. The designation of critical areas was slow, the
first being in 1949 and the second not until 1951. In the interim, drilling
26. Id.
27. D. MANN, supra note 14, at 48-49.
28. Id., p. 49. See also P. Higdon and Thompson. The 1980 Arizona GroundwaterManagement
Code (1980) ARIZ. ST. L.J. 628.
29. 1945 Ariz. Sess. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. Ch. 12.
30. Id.
31. 1979 Draft Recommendations, p. 1-7.
32. Id., p. 1-8.
33. Higdon and Thompson, supra note 28, at 628.
34. Session Laws, 1948, 6th Spec. Sess., ch. 5.
35. Id., sec. 2.
36. Id.
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activity increased dramatically as landowners sought to acquire extraction
rights in water-short areas prior to the designation of the area as critical.37
Drawbacks of the 1948 code coupled with rapidly increasing agricultural expansion and resultant overdraft led Governor Howard Pyle, in
1951, to appoint a second groundwater study commission.3 8 This commission recommended a bill, introduced in the legislature in 1952, that
would have divided the state's groundwater basins into three categories:
open, restricted, and closed. In closed basins, reductions in groundwater
pumping were required. In closed basins, reductions in groundwater pumping
were required. In restricted basins, no additional groundwater pumping
was allowed, and in open basins, there were to be no restrictions on
pumping. In addition, the bill declared groundwater public property and
adopted a system of rights based on the prior appropriation and correlative
rights doctrines. 39
While the second commission's bill was under consideration in the
legislature, the Arizona Supreme Court handed down a startling decision
that promised to change significantly the nature of groundwater rights in
the state. The case of Bristor v. Cheatham (Bristor 1)" reversed prior
court decisions on the subject and foundgroundwater to be public property
subject to prior appropriation. The combination of a lack of legislative
enthusiasm and the BristorI decision resulted in the failure of the second
commission's bill to pass. 4'
The decision, labeled by one commentator as "one of the most controversial ever rendered by the court," 42 resulted in widespread predictions
of calamity and inequity.43 Over a year later, after the appointment of a
new supreme court justice, the court again reversed itself and restored
44
the common law private ownership rule tempered by reasonable use.
In the wake of Bristor I, the legislature passed a bill authorizing the
governor to appoint a third groundwater commission, the Underground
Water Commission. On 1 January 1953, the Underground Water Commission made its recommendations to the legislature. Among other things,
its report called for the adoption of the correlative rights doctrine and the
closing of overdrafted areas to further irrigation pumping. 45 These rec37. D. MANN, supra note 14, at 53.
38. 1979 Draft Recommendations, supra note 25, at 1-9.
39. Id., see also D. MANN, supra note 14, at 55.
40. 73 Arizona 228, 240 P.2d 1, 85 (1952).
41. D. MANN, supra note 14, at 58.
42. Higdon and Thompson, supra note 28, at 629.
43. D. MANN, supra note 14, at 57-58.
44. Bristol v. Cheatham, 75 Arizona 227, 255 P.2d 173 (1953).
45. In addition, the recommendations called for provisions allowing municipal and industrial uses
to purchase water rights, the creation of local districts to determine the necessity of reductions in
pumping and the establishment of an administrative agency with enforcement powers. See D. MANN,
supra note 14, at 60.
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ommendations by the commission led to the drafting of a bill in 1954.
Pressure from the affected interests, backed by powerful committee members, prevented the bill's adoption. Instead, a bill was approved that
largely extended the provisions of the 1948 code.46 In 1955, the 1948
code and subsequent amendments were found to be a constitutional exercise of the state's police power.47
From 1954 until 1980, no significant legislation was enacted, although
there were several court decisions during this period that had an impact
on groundwater law and management. Most of these decisions dealt with
the transportation of groundwater. In 1960, the Supreme Court upheld a
landowner's right to transport water from land with a history of agricultural use prior to adoption of the 1948 code to land without this history.a
A series of cases from 1969 to 1976 involving the City of Tucson dealt
with the extent to which "reasonable use" prevented the transportation
of water off the land. These cases led to the creation of the fourth groundwater study commission. In 1969 in Jarvis v. State Land Department
(JarvisJ),49 the court granted landowners in the Avra and Altar Valleys,
part of the Morana Critical Groundwater Area, an injunction against the
State Land Department and the Land Commissioner, preventing the issuance of a permit to Tucson to transport water via pipeline over state
lands. The court found that Tucson's extractions would reduce available
supply and interfere with existing uses, illegal in a critical groundwater
area. In 1970 in Jarvis v. State Land Department (JarvisI/),50 the court
modified its earlier decision and allowed the city to acquire title to lands
being cultivated, retire those lands, and to transport and "withdraw an
amount equal to the annual historical maximum use upon the lands so52
acquired."'" In 1976 in Jarvis v. State Land Department (JarvisII1),
the court found that the annual historical maximum use was "to be
measured by the acreage previously farmed and not by the gross acreage
of the land purchased." 3 This resulted in a reduction of approximately
50% of the amount of water the city had claimed.54 In 1975, following
the flexible approach of Jarvis II, the court in Neal v. Hunt55 allowed the
transportation of groundwater from a non-critical area. The court limited
46.
63.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

1979 Draft Recommendations, supra note 25, at I-11; and D. MANN, supra note 14, at 62Southwestern Enginering Company v. Ernst, 79 Arizona 403, 291 P.2d 764 (1955).
State ex rel. Morrison v. Anway, 87 Arizona 206, 349 P.2d 774 (1960).
104 Arizona 527, 456 P.2d 385 (1969).
106 Arizona 506, 479 P.2d 169 (1970).
Id., 106 Ariz. 506, 511, 479 P.2d 169, 174 (1970).
113 Arizona 230, 550 P.2d 227 (1976).
Id.
Higdon and Thompson, supra note 25, at 630.
112 Arizona 307, 541 P.2d 559 (1975).
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such extractions to 300 gallons per minute on the basis that this would
not harm the water supply of other landowners within the basin.56
In 1976, in what has been called the court's most controversial decision
on the transportation of groundwater,57 the court granted an injunction
against the City of Tucson and several copper mining companies to pevent
the extraction and transportation of waters from the Sahuarita-Continental
Critical Groundwater Area to an area outside the critical groundwater
area but within the same groundwater basin. In FarmersInvestment Company v. Bettwy (FICO),5" the court found that water "may not be pumped
from one parcel and transported to another just because both overlie the
common source of supply if the plaintiff's lands or wells upon his lands
thereby suffer injury or damage. "" The court presumed injury from the
fact that water was being removed from a critical groundwater area.
FICO caused a great deal of controversy because it threw the future
of the mining industry and the rights of numerous extractors, including
the City of Tucson, into doubt. In reaction to the FICO decision and the
uncertainty it created, the legislature in 1977 amended the Critical
Groundwater Code to allow transportation of groundwater that had been
occurring as of 1 January 1977 to continue if the transporter obtained a
permit from the State Land Department. The permit system was to continue pending acceptance by the legislature of a comprehensive groundwater code. This legislation also established the Groundwater Management
Study Commission to develop a code. 6
Creation of the 1980 Groundwater ManagementAct.
The Groundwater Management Study Commission consisted of 25
members: seven each from the State Senate and the House of Representatives and eleven gubernatorial appointees. The gubernatorial appointees
were distributed among the major water users in the state as follows: two
representatives for cities and towns; two representatives from mining
interests; two representing agricultural interests; one each representing
the interests of Indians and electric utilities; and three representatives
from the general public. 6'
Agricultural interests, the major users of groundwater in the state and
presumably those with the most at stake in the development of a groundwater plan, felt their views were underrepresented on the commission
and the views of city and mining interests were overrepresented. During
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id.
1979 Draft Recommendations, supra note 25, at 1-12.
113 Arizona 520, 558 P.2d 14 (1976).
Id., 113 Arizona 520, 527, 558 P.2d 14, 21 (1976).
1977 Arizona Session Laws ch. 29.
Higdon and Thompson, supra note 28, at 631.
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hearings on the commission's 1979 draft report, several speakers testified
that agricultural interests were not represented fairly or adequately in the
draft report. For example, William Baker, secretary of the Agri-Business
Council of Arizona, remarked the commission had "scared the hell out
of agriculture" and labeled the work of the commission majority as "not
water management, but water confiscation without compensation." 62 These
sentiments also were expressed in the minority report of the 1979 draft
recommendations:
The equation is quite clear as we see it:
All entities but agriculturemay increasetheir groundwaterpumping.
Where the basin must be balancedthe cutback will be in agricultural
rata reduction without compensation. (Emphasis in
pumping by
63 pro
original.)
Division on the commission prevented it from meeting its 31 December
1979 due date for a final report of recommendations. As a result, "a
small group of negotiators representing the major water users, cities,
copper mines and farms, shut the door and began several hundred hours
of negotiations."' From these meetings, on 6 March 1980 there emerged
a report entitled "Concepts for Agreement" '65 and, finally, a "rough draft"
Groundwater Management Act on 5 June 1980.66 On June 6th, the full
commission accepted the draft; on June 11 th, the Arizona Groundwater
Management Code, introduced as Senate Bill 1001 and consisting of 176
pages, passed both houses of the legislature with more than two-thirds
approval in less than eight hours. On June 12th, because of an emergency
clause contained in the legislation, the bill became law immediately after
being signed by the Governor.67 On 30 November 1981, the Arizona
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Act. 68
This somewhat unusual legislative feat had several causes. As in the
past, the commission and the legislature were working under new threats
from the Department of the Interior that it would withhold Central Arizona
Project water allocations if a groundwater management plan was not
adopted quickly by the state.69 In addition, the Groundwater Management
Study Commission's enabling legislation contained provisions that if the
62. Ariz. Republic, Sept. 6, 1979, at BI, col. 2.
63. 1979 Draft Recommendations, supra note 25, at 6.
64. Ariz. Daily Star, June 11, 1980, atA, col. 3.
65. Ariz. Groundwater Mgmt. Comm'n, Concepts for Agreement-Integrated Package, March
6, 1980.
66. Ariz. Groundwater Mgmt. Comm'n., Rough Draft GroundwaterManagement Act, June 5,
1980.
67. Higdon and Thompson, supra note 28, at 621, 631-632.
68. Town of Chino Valley v. City of Prescott, 131 Ariz. 78, 638 P.2d 1324 (1981), appeal
(1982).
U.S. dismissed, 69. Higdon and Thompson, supra note 28, at 631.
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legislature failed to enact a groundwater management code by 7 September 1981, then the recommendations of the commission would become
law automatically on that date. 0
Major Provisions
The Arizona Groundwater Management Act 7' (hereinafter referred to
as the Act) is intended to provide "a framework for the comprehensive
management and regulation of the withdrawal, transportation, use, con72
servation and conveyance of rights to use the groundwater in this state."
Surface water rights are not affected. 3
The Act designates four Active Management Areas (AMA). Most provisions of the act affect only active management areas. (Significant exceptions will be noted below.)
The four active management areas are as follows: 4
1. The Tucson area, which includes the upper Santa Cruz and Avra
Valley sub-basins.
2. The Phoenix area, including the east and west Salt River Valleys,
Fountain Hills, Carefree, Lake Pleasant, Rainbow Valley and
Hassayampa sub-basins.
3. The Prescott area, including the little Chino and upper Agua Fria
sub-basins.
4. The Pinal area, including Maricopa-Stanfield, Eloy, Aguirre Valley, Santa Rosa Valley and Vekol Valley sub-basins.
These four areas comprise over 80 percent of the state's population and
69 percent of the state'a total overdraft. 5
After hearings, additional active management areas may be created by
the director of the Department of Water Resources if he finds it necessary
to preserve the water supply, protect propert or storage capacity, or prevent
water quality degradation. 7 6 The Act also contains procedures for local
formation of an AMA. Upon petition by ten percent of the voters in a
proposed AMA, all registered voters in the groundwater basin in question
vote on the issue. 7
Administration
The Act created the State Department of Water Resources (DWR). The
70. 1977 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 29.
71. For a more detailed summary see Higdon and Thompson, supra note 28; and J. Johnson,
Summary of the 1980 Arizona GroundwaterManagement Act, State Bar of Arizona, 1980.
72. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §45-401.
73. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §45-451 (B), 466.
74. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §45-411 (A).
75. J. Johnson, supra note 71, at 3.
76. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §412 (A), 413.
77. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §45-415.
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Act vested in DWR all ground and surface water management responsibilities, except water quality control, which remained the responsibility
of the Department of Health Services. 78 The DWR also took over the
duties of the Arizona Water Commission, although the commission would
continue to serve in an advisory capacity to the director of the DWR, the
Governor and the legislature on the effectiveness and adequacy of all
ground and surface water law.79
Under the Act, the governor appoints the director of the DWR with
the advice and consent of the Senate. The qualifications of the director
are that he be "experienced and competent in water resources management
and conservation, and . . . have proven administrative ability." 8 0 The

director is given wide discretion in organizing and staffing the DWR,
utilizing professionals from other state agencies and hiring outside consultants. 8'
This centralization of administrative control at the state level was "one
of the thorniest issues faced by the Commission." ' 82 In its initial draft
report, issued in mid-1979, the commission recommended that "most
management activities should take place at the local level, but ...

sta-

tutory guidelines should be provided, and the state should retain oversight
and enforcement powers." 8 3 The report noted that a minority of the commission members favored state management and "feared that local
groundwater management meant no groundwater management." 84 By the
time the Concepts for Agreement report came out in March 1980, the
minority had become the majority.
AMA Management Goals and Plans
The Act sets goals for management of the four active management
areas. For the Tucson, Phoenix and Prescott areas the goal is to attain
safe-yield by 1 January 2025 or sooner, as determined by the director. 85
Safe-yield is defined as long-term balance between annual withdrawals
and natural and artificial groundwater recharge. 86 The goal for the Pinal
AMA is to allow development of non-irrigation uses and to allow current
agricultural uses to continue "for as long as feasible, consistent with the
necessity to preserve future water supplies for non-irrigation uses." 87
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-102-103.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-124.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-102.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §45-104.
Higdon and Thompson, supra note 28, at 634.
1979 Draft Recommendations, supra note 25, at III-10.
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The Act requires the director to appoint an area director for each AMA
but gives the director discretion to appoint an area director for more than
one AMA."8 Area directors assist in the development of AMA management
plans and implement plans under the supervision of the director.8 9 The
Director and area directors are assisted in formulating and implementing
management plans by groundwater-users advisory councils. The governor
appoints the five-member councils for six-year terms to represent the
users of groundwater in each AMA.'
To attain the goals described above for each AMA, the Act provides
for five management periods: 1980 to 1990, 1990 to 2000, 2000 to 2010,
2011 to 2020 and 2020-2025. For each of these periods, the act requires
the director to promulgate management plans no later than 1 January
1983, 1 January 1988, 1 January 1998, 1 January 2008 and 1 January
2019, respectively.9' In general terms, these management plans require
the director, after public hearings, to impose increasingly stringent mandatory conservation measures on all groundwater users within the areas
to meet the goals of each AMA. In the event the management plans do
not prove sufficient to meet the conservation goals in an AMA, the act
empowers the director, after 1 January 2006, to purchase and retire water
rights for irrigated land.92
These purchases are to be financed by pump taxes on all persons
withdrawing water within an AMA. (Domestic well exceptions are discussed below.) The amount of the tax is limited to a maximum of $5 per
acre-foot of which no less than $.50 nor more than $1 can be used for
DWR administrative and enforcement expenses. No more than $2 may
be used for augmentation of the AMA water supply by importation,
storage or artificial recharge and no more than $2 may be used for the
purchase and retirement of irrigated lands.93
Scope of the Act
Domestic wells, defined as those having a maximum pump capacity
of not more than 35 gallons a minute used for domestic purposes, including the noncommercial irrigation of not more than one acre of land,
are exempt from most provisions of the Act. The exceptions are that the
wells are subject to registration requirements, and new wells must be
drilled in accordance with construction standards promulgated by the
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
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director. Registration and construction requirements apply to all wells in
the state regardless of location.94
Under the 1948 water code, six areas had been designated Critical
Groundwater Areas by 1980. Of these six, four became active management areas under the Act. The remaining two areas, the Douglas Critical
Groundwater Area and the Joseph City Critical Groundwater Area, were
designated by the Act as "Irrigation Non-Expansion Areas. 95 Additional
irrigation non-expansion areas may be created by the director in the event
there is insufficient supply at current rates of withdrawal to provide a safe
supply for irrigation and an AMA is determined to be unnecessary.9 6 The
Act also has provisions for local initiation, by petition, of additional
irrigation non-expansion areas.9 7 The director may convert an irrigation
non-expansion area to an AMA if all the criteria for the creation of an
AMA, as outlined above, are met.98
Designation as an irrigation non-expansion area limits acreage that may
be cultivated to the highest amount cultivated during any one year of the
five years prior to the creation of the non-expansion area.99 For lands
within the Douglas or Joseph City Critical Groundwater areas, this period
is from 1 January 1975 to 1 January 1980. " For subsequently designated
non-expansion areas, the five-year period ends when the director gives
notice of designation or, in the case of locally-initiated designation attempts, when the requisite petition is filed with the registrar of voters. 101
In addition, all withdrawals from nonexempt wells in non-expansion areas
must be measured by a device approved by the director and a report filed
with the director on a calendar year basis no later than March 31st of the
following year." 2
Rights Within AMA's
Within an AMA water may be extracted only under a "grandfather
right" or pursuant to a permit. There are three types of grandfather rights
designated in the Act: 1) irrigation grandfather rights; 2) type I nonirrigation grandfather rights; and 3) type II non-irrigation grandfather
rights.'o 3 To claim any of these rights an application must be filed with
the DWR within fifteen months of the designation of an AMA.'o
94. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-402.6, 454, 593; 594.
95. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-431.
96. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-432.
97. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-433.
98. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-439.
99. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-434, 437(A)(B).
100. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-437(A).
101. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §45-434.
102. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-437(C).
103. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-462(D).
104. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-476(A).
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IrrigationGrandfatherRights. Land in one of the initial active management areas that was irrigated at some time during the five years prior
to 1 January 1980 has an irrigation grandfather right. In subsequently
designated areas, the land must have been irrigated sometime during the
five years prior to the designation of the AMA.° 5 Only lands irrigated
during these periods have a right to groundwater for irrigation purposes.
Irrigation grandfathered rights may be conveyed to others for farming
purposes.
Type I Non-Irrigation GrandfatheredRight. When an individual purchases and retires from cultivation an irrigation grandfather right, the
right becomes a type I non-irrigation right. Once this change is made, it
is irreversible. " This type of water right is usually three acre-feet a year
per acre of land, although if the amount of water actually used for cultivation was less, or if the farm practiced crop rotation wherein some
portion of the land was always unirrigated, the amount will be less than
three acre feet.0 7
A type I right may be used for any purpose other than irrigation, unless
the land lies within the service area of a city, town, or private water
district. In that situation, the water must be used for electricity generation,
unless water is unavailable from the municipal or private distributor.0 8
Upon approval of a development plan by the DWR, an individual may
retire irrigated land, use no water, and not jeopardize his future type I
non-irrigation right. "°
Type 11 Non-IrrigationRight. These are the rights established by virtue
of extractions having been made for non-irrigation purposes prior to
designation as an AMA. The right created is to the highest amount of
extractions during any one of the five years prior to creation of the AMA,
or 1 January 1980 in the case of the four initial active management areas."10
There is no location limitation on the use of type II rights. Type II
rights may be conveyed freely and used for any purpose except cultivation."' When a type II right is held by an electric utility or mining
company, the right cannot be used or conveyed2 for any purpose other
than power generation or mining, respectively."
IrrigationWater Available
The amount of water available under an irrigation grandfathered right
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

ARIZ.
ARIZ.
ARIZ.
ARIZ.
ARIZ.
ARIZ.
ARIZ.
ARIZ.

REV.
REV.
REV.
REV.
REV.
REV.
REV.
REV.

STAT. ANN.
STAT. ANN.
STAT. ANN.
STAT. ANN.
STAT. ANN.
STAT. ANN.
STAT. ANN.
STAT. ANN.

§45-465(A).
§45-473(A).
§45-463(A)(B), 469(F).
§45-472(C).
§45-469.
§45464.
§ 45-474.
§45-471, 474.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 24

is determined by multiplying the "irrigation water duty" by the "water
duty acres." The conservation requirements and water duties also apply
to irrigation districts. Water duty acres are the number of acres in cultivation in any one of the five years prior to creation of the AMA, or 1
January 1980 in the case of the four initial active management areas. The
irrigation water duty is the amount of water the engineer finds reasonable
to irrigate an acre of land, given accepted conservation practices and
historically grown crops."'
The conservation aspects of the five management periods discussed
above are enforced through manipulation (i.e. steady decrease) of the
irrigation water duty." 4 To illustrate the function of the water duty acres
and the irrigation water acres, assume a farmer owns 600 acres of which
no more than 300 are in cultivation during any one year prior to creation
of the AMA. The farmer therefore has 300 water duty acres. In this area
cotton is the predominant crop and, given crop needs and modem conservation techniques, the director of the DWR determines 3.8 acre-feet
per year is a reasonable amount for irrigation. The irrigation water duty
is 3.8. The amount of water available, then, is 1,140 acre-feet.
A farmer may withdraw less than the amount of the water determined
to be allowed by the director in a given year and withdraw that "saved"
water in a subsequent year, effectively establishing a credit for future
years. Farmers also can extract more than the allowed amount-up to 50
percent in a given year-and make up the difference in a subsequent
year. "15
Well Regulations
The Act requires that all wells in the state be registered with the director
by 12 June 1982. The director provides forms for this purpose, which
include, among other things, a legal description, depth, diameter, and
capacity of the well. Upon transfer of ownership, the seller has the
responsibility to notify the director of the transfer and of the buyer to
keep recorded information accurate." 6
The Act further provides for the registration of well contractors with
the director and empowers the director to issue licenses and establish
minimum qualifications for obtaining a license. "' Well drillers are required to keep a log of each well drilled and, after completion, file with
113.
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the director a report showing equipment installed, capacity, drawdown,
and groundwater level. 8
Prior to construction of a well in an AMA, a permit must be obtained
from the director. " 9 If a well needs to be deepened or replaced in an
AMA, a notice must be filed with the director. 2 ' Prior to the drilling or
deepening of a well outside an AMA, a notice of intent must be filed
with the director.' The content requirements for all the above notices
and permits are basically the same, i.e. name, location, capacity, etc.' 22
Municipal and Private Water Company Pumping in an AMA
In active management areas, cities, towns, and private water companies
may increase their pumping within their service areas to meet the needs
of landowners and residents within the service area.' 23 The service area
includes those areas receiving water during any one of the five years prior
to creation of the AMA. Pumping cannot be increased outside the service
area unless additional rights are acquired. 24
' A service area can be extended
unless the extension is for the purpose of "(1) including a well field within
the service area, (2) furnishing water for irrigation or large amounts of
water for industrial uses, or (3) extinguishing the right of an owner of
irrigated land to sell that land together with its irrigation Grandfathered
Right for conversion to non-irrigation use.""
Permits
In addition to rights based on a grandfather clause or extractions made
by a municipality or private water company, the Act provides for seven
different types fo withdrawal permits. Permits are issued by the director
of the DWR.
Mine Dewatering Permits. The Act provides for the issuance of dewatering permits for the extraction or processing of minerals. The Act
further designates distribution priorities for water that results126from dewatering. In descending order, those priorities are as follows:
a) for use in the mining or processing operation or to meet environmental control requirements;
b) to a person adversely affected by dewatering;
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c) for communities directly related to the extraction and processing
operation;
d) to irrigate land owned or controlled by the permittee which is
entitled to the use of groundwater for irrigation;
e) to the director for such use as will best achieve the goals of the
management plan for the AMA;
f) and finally, to the permittee for whatever legal use he chooses.
In the event the water is to be disposed of at the discretion of the
director (i.e. under "e" above), this does not create an obligation on the
part of the permittee to treat, pay withdrawal fees, deliver beyond his
property boundaries, or continue deliveries once mining activity has halted. 127
Mineral Extraction and Processing Permit. Individuals engaged in
mineral extraction and processing may be issued a groundwater withdrawal permit if: 1) the water available under a dewatering permit is
insufficient; 2) Central Arizona Project water is unavailable at a cost that
does not exceed current municipal and industrial project delivery rates;
and 3) other surface water is unavailable at a cost that does not exceed
by 25 percent the cost of withdrawing groundwater. 128 Mineral extraction
and processing permits may be issued for a period of up to 50 years and
may be revoked in the event
Central Arizona Project or other surface
29
water becomes available. 1
GeneralIndustrial Use Permits. These permits may be issued to any
non-irrigation user except mining companies if water is unavailable or
alternate sources are cost prohibitive. The permittee must demonstrate
that there is an assured water supply, i.e., sufficient groundwater is available for the intended use over the life of the permit. Industrial use permits
also are issued for up to 50 years and may be revoked if surface water
becomes available.' 3
Poor Quality Permits. In the event groundwater is too poor in quality
that, in the opinion of the director, it has no other beneficial use, he can
issue a permit for its extraction, if such extraction is consistent with the
goals of the managemnt plan for the AMA. This permit is issued for up
to 35 years and may be terminated if water quality improves.'' Water
extracted under a poor quality permit would generally be water that could
serve no municipal 32or irrigation purpose but may be useful for some
industrial function. 1
Temporary Permitsfor Generation of Electricity. In an emergency, the
127.
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director can issue a permit for extractions necessary to produce electricity.
Under this section when the emergency commences the extractor can
begin the otherwise illegal withdrawals prior to receiving a permit and
then, "as soon as reasonably practicable," submit evidence that an 33
emergency exists. The permit terminates at the end of the emergency. '
Temporary DewateringPermits. If necessary for the beneficial use of
a given area and consistent with the management plan for the AMA, the
34
director may issue a temporary dewatering permit for up to one year.
These permits might be issued for such things as dewatering construction

sites. 135
Drainage Permits. This permit allows for drainage of irrigated lands
to increase agricultural Production as might be necessary, for example,
after a flood.136
Enforcement andAppeal Provisions
All decisions of the director may be appealed to a special judge chosen
by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court to hear those cases. During
appeal, no new evidence may be introduced unless, in the discretion of
the court, "justice demands the admission of such evidence."',' 3 The
decision of the director is not stayed pending appeal, but the cases do
have priority over all other civil matters.' 38
The Act empowers the director to cease and desist orders for any
violations of the act or of rules and regulations promulgated under the
act. In the event the violation continues after issuance of the cease and
desist order, the director may seek from the superior court a temporary
restraining order or a preliminary injunction. '3
The Act provides for civil and criminal penalties for violations of the
code. Civil 'fines of up to $100 a day may be levied against violators
engaged in activity not directly related to illegal use, withdrawal, or
transportation of groundwater. Fines of up to $10,000 a day may be levied
against violators engaged in activity directly related to illegal use, withdrawal, or transport. When assessing penalties, the Act instructs the court
to take into consideration public harm, willfulness, past conduct and
actions to mitigate damage among other things. "
Criminal penalties may be imposed if a person knowingly falsifies or
renders inaccurate a measuring device (class six felony) or knowingly
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violates or refuses to comply with any rule or regulation in the act (class
two misdemeanor). Knowing and intentional withdrawal or use of groundwater in violation of the act is a class six felony if the amount is 1,000
acre-feet or more, a class one misdemeanor if the amount is between 100
and 1,000 acre-feet, and a class three misdemeanor if the amount is 100
acre-feet or less."'4 The Act establishes a "groundwater enforcement fund,"
initially $100,000, to cover enforcement costs. Civil fines are deposited
in the fund.'4 2
Beginning in 1980, the director of the Arizona Department of Water
Resources was given substantial powers over the use of groundwater in
the state's active management areas. Through the regulation of drilling
permits and the manipulation of the "irrigation water duty," among other
things, Arizona has the "'most comprehensive' (groundwater
manage43
ment system) of any state in the American West." 1
What distinguishes Arizona from the other states in this study, aside
from their groundwater laws, is that the system of rights administration
in Arizona is relatively new. The attitudes of groundwater pumpers toward
centralized state administration of groundwater rights at the time they
were interviewed may not reflect their true opinions on the water bureaucracy in Arizona (not having had time to see how the DWR will
function), but their general attitudes toward the advantages and disadvantages of centralized administration may be accurately reflected.
CALIFORNIA GROUNDWATER LAW
Groundwater is managed on the local level in California. State level
involvement is, among other things, limited to the collection of data on
pumping in certain areas, the formulation of well construction, and abandonment guidelines. Local management has taken three basic forms. In
some parts of the state, notably, the San Joaquin Valley, the cumulative
uncoordinated decisions of individual groundwater pumpers have led to
overdrafting and a de facto policy of groundwater mining. In other parts
of the state, notably in large parts of southern California, coordinated
management of groundwater basins has taken place either through adjudication or the creation of a water district. What follows is a discussion
of forms of water district and adjudcative management.
Water districts in California take on a variety of forms. Some are created
by a specific legislative act, others under general acts. Methods of selection of district governing bodies vary from independent election by all
141.
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district voters, election by property owners, and various methods of appointment. As of 1977, over 900 special districts in California performed
some water utility functions. These districts vary significantly in their
powers, functions, and methods of creation, but generally they share an
authority to "levy taxes, issue both general obligation and revenue bonds,
and set rates for services."'" (As of 1978 and the passage of proposition
13, the property tax limitation initiative, local governmental units in
California are prohibited from imposing "special taxes" unless approved
145
by two-thirds of the qualified voters in the governmental unit.)
The Orange County Water District (OCWD) "has been the leader in
the water district non-adjudication approach to groundwater management. "46 The OCWD has extensive powers to require data from groundwater pumpers, regulate pumping patterns, levy a pump tax and, through
a "basin equity assessment," regulate the cost of groundwater in order
to influence the amounts of ground versus surface water being used. A
major function of the OCWD is to recharge groundwater basins with
imported surface water and natural runoff. For this purpose,
the district
47
owns 1,000 acres in and adjacent to the Santa Ana River.
Management by a court-appointed watermaster occurs after the adjudication of the extraction rights of pumpers in a management area. The
powers of a watermaster are similar to those held by water districts. For
example, the San Gabriel watermaster, 14 a nine-member court-appointed
body, can operate a groundwater replenishment program, control basin
storage and levy a "replacement water assessment" on the amount of
withdrawal in excess of a pumper's adjudicated share. As reported by
the California Governor's Commission to Review the California Water
Rights Law, nearly "all groundwater adjudications have ended with a
stipulation for judgment .... Parties have reached agreements on allocations they believe to be fair and reasonable and have agreed to watermaster managements. 149
Water districts and watermasters with adequate authority to manage
groundwater basins are atypical forms of groundwater management in
144. M. Goodall, J. Sullivan and T. De Young, Water Districts in California:An Analysis by
Type of EnablingAct and PoliticalDecision Process, California, Department of Water Resources

(March 1977), p. 2.
145. "Ballot PropositionAnalysis, 1978 Cal. J., 153.
146. Governor's Comm'n to Review California Water Rights Law, Final Report 146 (1978)
[hereinafter referred to as Governor'sReport]. For a more detailed summary of the Orange County
Water District's management see P. Allen and G. Elser, They Said it Couldn'tBe Done-The Orange
County CaliforniaExperience, 30 DESALINIZATION 23-38 (1979).
147. Allen and Elser, supra note 146, at 27-28.
148. Upper San Gabriel Valley Municipal Water District v. City of Alhambra, Civil No. 924128,
Cal. Super. Ct., Los Angeles County, 4 January 1973. For a more detailed summary of the San
Gabriel situation see Governor's Report, supra note 146, at 147.
149. Governor'sReport, supra note 146, at 148.
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California. In most parts of the state, groundwater management is nothing
more than the cumulative decisions of individual pumpers.
The California State Water Resources Control Board and the Department of Water Resources in June 1981 issued a report entitled "Policies
and Goals for California Water Management" wherein a goal for groundwater management stated in part "while planned variation in ground water
pumping is essential to the regulation of a variable supply to satisfy the
relatively uniform annual demand, ground water overdraft is not consistent with sound water resources management practices." 5 0 The State of
California has articulated a groundwater management goal that is inconsistent with current management practices. This result in groundwater
law in California is, for the most part, due to case law.
CorrelativeRights Doctrine
Prior to 1903, California courts had followed the English common law
rule of absolute ownership. Holding that percolating waters were part of
the land and belonged to the owners of the land, the Supreme Court had
found that extractions of water on one's land that interfered with extractions on adjacent lands were not actionable.'
In 1903, the California Supreme Court, in the landmark case of Katz
v. Walkinshaw'52 (Katz), rejected the absolute ownership doctrine. The
court held that reasonable use should govern the rights of overlying
landowners. The court held that reasonable use "limits the right of others
to such amount of water as may be necessary for some
useful purpose
' 53
in connection with the land from which it is taken."'
In dicta, the Katz court also outlined what it called the "rule of correlative rights." Taken together, the rule of correlative rights and the
requirement of reasonable and beneficial use provide that landowners
overlying a common source of percolating groundwater have equal or
correlative rights to a reasonable amount of the water when applied to a
reasonable beneficial use on the land overlying the groundwater basin.
Subsequent cases have clarified and affirmed the correlative rights doctrine. In 1928, through the initiative process, a reasonable and beneficial
requirement was added to the California Constitution. 5 4 Although initially
55
a response to a Supreme Court decision dealing with surface water rights,
150. Dept. of Water Resources, California, Policies, and Goalsfor CaliforniaWater Management,
(1981) at 5.
151. Vineland Irrigation District v. Azusa Irrigation Co., 126 Cal. 486, 58 P. 1057 (1899).
152. Katz v. Walkinshaw, 141, Cal. 116, 74 P. 766 (1903).
153. Id., 141 Cal. at 134, 74 P. at 771.
154. CAL. CONST. art. 10, § 2 (originally art. 14 § 3), see Governor's Comm'n To Review
California Water Rights Law, Apropriative Water Rights in California, 13 (1977).
155. Herminghaus v. Southern California Edison Company, 200 Cal. 81, 252 P. 607 (1926).
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the court, in 1935, found the amendment also applied to groundwater.' 56
Under the correlative rights doctrine, priority in time does not give priority
in right. In Burr v. Maclay Rancho Water Co., the Supreme Court held
that overlying landowners had equal rights regardless of the fact that
defendant had not exercised his right.' 57
In the event the underground supply is inadequate to satisfy the needs
of overlying landowners, each owner is entitled to a reasonable share of
the supply.' 58 The courts may determine the reasonableness of extractions
in cases and restrict overlying landowners to their reasonable share. 59
Non-Overlying Use
A surplus of percolating groundwater may be extracted for use on
distant lands. Those extractions are subject to the doctrine of prior appropriation, and those rights are inferior to the rights of overlying landowners using the water on overlying lands.' In the event an overlying
landowner has not exercised his right, he may protect his right against
the extractions of a surplus appropriator by seeking a declaratory judgment.' 6' An overlying use includes use on land within a given groundwater
basin or watershed and is not
limited to use on the particular parcel where
62
the pumping is occurring.
Prescription
An appropriative taking of water which is not surplus is wrongful
and may ripen into a prescriptive right where the use is actual, open
and notorious, hostile and adverse to the original owner, continuous
and uninterrupted for the statutory period of five years, and under
claim of right. 63
For a prescriptive right to ripen, the appropriation must be during a
period of overdraft. Therefore, if during any of the five years of the
adverse use there exists a surplus, the appropriation is not wrongful, and
the statutory period does not run. 11 In addition, the owner of the original
right must be on notice that an overdraft exists. The assertion that the
156. Peabody v. City of Vallejo, 2 Cal. 2d 351, 40 P.2d 486 (1935).
157. Burr v. Maclay Rancho Water Co., 160 Cal. 268, 116 P. 715 (1911).
158. Cohen v. LaCanada Land & Water Co., 142 Cal. 437, 76 P. 47 (1904); Pasadena v. Alhambra,
33 Cal. 2d 908, 207 P.2d 17 (1949).
159. San Bernadino v. Riverside, 186 Cal. 7, 198 P. 784 (1921).
160. Katz v. Walkinshaw, 141 Cal. 116, 135, 74 P. 766, 772 (1903); Los Angeles v. San Fernando,
14 Cal. 3d 199, 293, 537 P.2d 1250, 1318, 123 Cal. Rptr. 1, 69 (1975).
161. Burr v. Maclay Rancho Water Co., 154 Cal. 428, 436, 98 P. 260, 264 (1908).
162. Pasadena v. Alhambra, 33 Cal. 2d 908, 925, 207 P.2d 17, 28 (1949).
163. Id., 33 Cal. 2d 908, 926-927, 207 P.2d 17, 29 (1949).
164. Los Angeles v. San Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d 199, 284, 537 P.2d 1250, 1312, 123 Cal. Rptr.
1, 63 (1975).
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original owner's rights are being invaded or the mere lowering of the
water levels during the period of wrongful appropriation is not, in itself,
adequate notice. 165
Rights of overlying owners and surplus appropriators, as well as rights
acquired through a prior prescription, may be lost through prescription.
During an overdraft, parties can protect themselves from additional rights
being acquired by prescription through injunctive relief. 166 By continuing
to pump during the prescriptive period, those private parties with prior
rights will retain their proportionate share of the safe yield in a basin. 6 7
Physical Solutions
At times the strict application of water rights in a case will result in
waste, for example, when a senior appropriator is entitled to an injunction
against a junior appropriator, and the result will be a reduction in the
total amount of water available to both parties. In those cases, California
courts have fashioned "physical solutions."
In City of Lodi v. East Bay Municipal Utility District,'68 the supreme
court read article 14, section 3 of the California Constitution 169 (requiring
the beneficial use of water and prohibiting waste), as giving the courts
an affirmative duty "to ascertain whether there exists a physical solution
of the problem presented that will avoid the waste, and that will at the
same time not unreasonably and adversely affect the prior appropriator's
vested property right."' 70
In any dispute involving the water rights of parties, the courts may
fashion a physical solution designed to prevent waste while protecting
superior rights. From 1903 until 1949, courts applied the correlative rights
doctrine and often sought physical solutions that would avoid waste. 17'
During this period, it became apparent that merely establishing and upholding the rights among parties would not protect groundwater basins
from overdrafts. One commentator noted:
The court would enjoin pumping only if and when withdrawals directly interfered with pumping activities of other producers who were
prior in right.
By the mid 1930s, it became apparent that steps had to be taken in
165. Id., 14 Cal. 3d at 282, 537 P.2d at 311, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 62 (1975).
166.. Los Angeles v. San Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d 199, 278, 537 P.2d 1250, 1307, 123 Cal. Rptr.
1, 58 (1975).
167. Id., 14 Cal. 3d 199, 293, 537 P.2d 1250, 1318, 123 Cal. Rptr. 1, 69.
168. 7 Cal. 2d 316, 60 P.2d 439 (1936).
169. The 1928 Constitutional Amendment now Cal. Const. art. 10, § 2.
170. City of Lodi v. East Bay Municipal Utility District, 7 Cal. 2d 316, 339, 60 P.2d 439, 450
(1936).
171. Governor's Comm'n to Review California Water Rights Law, Groundwater Rights in California, 19 (1977).
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order to control the total amount of water pumped from the groundwater basins of Southern California. The hit and miss tactics of
individually oriented adjudications of groundwater rights were not
effective in coping with the tremendous disparity between groundwater supplies and demands. To remedy this situation, it was again
necessary for the Supreme Court to revise the groundwater laws of
this state.' 72

This revision came in the form of the "mutual prescription doctrine" in
City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra,"3 (Pasadena).
Pasadena involved pumpers in the Raymond Basin in Southern California. For 22 of the 24 years prior to filing the suit, the Raymond Basin
had been in a condition of overdraft. The court found that appropriators
causing the overdraft were invading the rights of overlying owners and
prior appropriators, but they had acquired prescriptive rights. Although
leaving open the question whether or not overlying owners had obtained
new prescriptive rights, the court found that, by their continued pumping,
overlying owners retained their rights to future extractions.
The original owners by their own acts ...

thus retained or acquired

a right to continue to take some water in the future. The wrongdoers
also acquired prescriptive rights to continue to take water, but their
rights were limited to the extent that the original owners retained or
acquired rights by their pumping. 74
Upholding the trial court's decision, the supreme court limited total
withdrawals to the safe yield of the basin and found all acquired prescriptive rights were of equal priority. The extractions of all parties were
limited to their proportion of the safe-yield based on total extractions
during any five-year period from the beginning of the overdraft until the
filing of the suit.' 75 The decision in the Pasadenacase was based on a
stipulation agreed upon by all the parties to the case except the appellant,
California-Michigan Land & Water Company. The court's decision applied to all the parties.
172. R. Reis, Legal Planning For Ground Water Production, 36 S. CAL. L. REV. 484, 487
(1965).
173. 33 Cal. 2d 908, 207 P.2d 17 (1949). Most commentators have seen Pasadenaas adopting
the mutual prescription doctrine in California (see e.g. Reis, supra note 172, at 488; Governor's
Comm'n, supra note 171, at 19). For a contrary view, see W. HUTCHINS, II WATER RIGHTS
LAW IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN STATES 677-78 (1974). Hutchins notes that the Pasadena
court did not use the term mutual prescription and argues instead that the court decided the case,
"... on the basis of the concept of prescriptive rights in the classical sense and on the doctrine of
correlative rights as developed in California" (p. 678). Regardless of whether or not the Pasadena
court intended to adopt the mutual prescription doctrine the practical result (i.e. the remedy) was
the same.
174. City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra, 33 Cal. 2d 908, 933, 207 P.2d 17, 32 (1949).
175. Id., at 922, 207 P.2d at 26.
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Concerning the mutual prescription doctrine and the stipulated judgment approach after Pasadena,one commentator noted:
Many adjudications .

.

. have followed a pattern of negotiation to

find a physical solution, stipulation for judgment, and judgment. The
first step of this stipulated judgment approach generally has been to
apply the mutual prescription formula to the available pumping data.
By agreeing to apply a formula, the parties have avoided adversary
proceedings in many situations where determination of complex appropriative priorities might in any event have been impossible because of insufficient and unreliable data.16 (Footnotes omitted.)
Mutual PrescriptionAfter San Fernando
In 1975 the California Supreme Court decided the case of City of Los
Angeles v. City of San Francisco77 (San Fernando). The San Fernando
case had a significant impact on several aspects of California groundwater
law.
In 1955, the City of Los Angeles brought suit against the cities of San
Fernando, Glendale, and Burbank, the Crescenta Valley County Water
District, and various private parties. Los Angeles sought to quiet title and
obtain a declaration of its superior rights to water underlying the Upper
Los Angeles River Area. In addition, Los Angeles sought to enjoin the
defendants from making extractions that interfered with the plaintiff's
claimed prior rights.178
The impact of the San Fernando decision on the mutual prescription
doctrine was primarily threefold. First, the court upheld the City of Los
Angeles' argument that Civil Code Section 1007,179 prohibiting the acquisition of prescriptive rights by any person, firm, or corporation against
176. Governor's Comm'n, supra note 171, at 23-24. The author cites several cases that have
followed ths approach including California Water Service Co. v. Sidebotham & Son, 244 Cal. App.
2d 715, 37 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1964) and Tehachapi-Cummings County Water District v. Armstrong, 49
Cal. App. 3d 993, 122 Cal. Rptr. 918 (1975).
177. 14 Cal. 3d 199, 537 P.2d 1250, 123 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1975). Only those parts of the case
affecting prescription will be discussed here. The balance of the case will be treated later in this
section.
178. Id., 14 Cal. 3d 199, 207, 537 P.2d 1250, 1258, 123 Cal. Rptr. 1, 9 (1975).
179. CAL. CIVIL CODE § 1007 was amended in 1935 to read in pertinent part, ...
no possession by any person, firm, or corporation no matter how long continued of any... water, water
right ... owned by any county, city and county, city, irrigation district, public or municipal corporation or any department or agency thereof, shall ever ripen into any title, interest or right against
such county, city and county..." In 1968 the section was amended to read, ". . . but no possession
by any person, firm or corporation no matter how long continued of any ... water, water right...
dedicated to a public use by a public utility, or dedicated to or owned by the state or any public
entity, shall ever ripen into any title, interest or right against the owner therof." The San Fernando
court found "any person, firm or corporation" to include municipal entities. (14 Cal. 3d 199, 278,
537 P.2d 1250, 1307, 123 Cal. Rptr. 1, 58).
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a city, county, public utility, or other public entity prevented the courts
from imposing a mutual prescription formula on a city absent the city's
consent. 8 ' Private pumpers are at a disadvantage vis-d-vis public pumpers. Private pumpers can lose their rights through prescription to public
pumpers, but public pumpers cannot lose their rights to either private or
public pumpers through prescription.
The second impact the San Fernando decision had on prescription and
on available management alternatives for groundwater basins concerns
the definition of overdraft. In Pasadena,the court had defined overdraft
as a condition in which extractions exceed safe yield. 8 ' The San Fernando
court expanded this definition by interpreting safe yield to include additions and withdrawals over an extended period of time.
Ground basin levels tended to vary in accordance with wide fluctuations in precipitation. Thus if a rising level of extractions were
halted at the point of the safe yield based on the . . . [long term]
... average, ensuing heightening of groundwater levels during years
of higher-than-average precipitation would cause waste.8 2 (Footnotes
omitted.)
The court thus concluded that overdraft occurred83only when extractions
exceeded safe yield plus any temporary surplus.
As discussed above, prescription requires adversity. 84 Overdraft constitutes the necessary adversity. For the prescriptive right to ripen, overdraft must continue for five consecutive years. If during any one of the
five years there is a surplus, the prescriptive period ceases to run. Consequently, the definition of overdraft articulated by the San Fernando
court 5will make overdraft, hence prescription, more difficult to estab8
lish. 1
The third impact San Fernando had on prescription concerns the element of notice. For the prescription period to run, the holders of the
original rights must be on notice that an overdraft exists. In Pasadena,
the lowering of the water table was determined to be adequate notice of
an overdraft. 8 6 Consistent with its new definition of overdraft, the San
Fernandocourt found that the lowering of the water table alone was not
180. Los Angeles v. San Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d 199, 270, 537 P.2d 1250, 1301, 123 Cal. Rptr.
1, 52 (1975).
181. Pasadena v. Alhambra, 33 Cal. 2d 908, 929, 207, P.2d 17, 30 (1949).
182. Los Angeles v. San Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d 199, 208, 537 P.2d 1250, 1309, 123 Cal. Rptr.
1, 59 (1975).
183. Id., 14 Cal. 3d 199, 280, 537 P.2d 1250, 1309, 123 Cal. Rptr. 1, 60 (1975).
184. Supra note 163.
185. Supra note 163-165.
186. Pasadena v. Alhambra, 33 Cal. 2d 908, 930, 207 P.2d 17, 31 (1949).
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adequate notice, and owners of prior rights must be on notice in fact that
there is an overdraft. 187
In this regard, one commentator noted the following:
It may be that, in order to establish notice after San Fernando, a
pumper who wants to perfect his prescriptive rights will finance
hydrological determinations of overdraft in a basin and, based on
that data, actually notify other basin pumpers of the basin's overdraft. 188
In its discussion of mutual prescription, the San Fernandocourt found
several drawbacks to the doctrine. The court noted that determination of
prescriptive rights on the basis of the highest level of pumping during
any five-year period of the overdraft had in the past resulted in a "race
to the pumphouse. . . each party endeavoring to increase the volume of
continuous use on which his prescriptive right will be based."' 89 After
the San Fernandodecision, one of the state's leading hydrologists wrote
the following:
More than one industry has gone into agricultural activities on lands
adjacent to its plant, and has been granted pumping rights on the
basis of both industrial and agricultural use, the latter sometimes of
questionable economic justification."
The court also questioned the equity of a mutual prescription solution
to groundwater disputes. Although avoiding criticism of the Pasadena
decision and the application of the doctrine given the facts in that case,
the court noted use of the doctrine ". . . does not necessarily result in
the most equitable apportionment of water according to need. A true
equitable apportionment would take into account many more factors."' 9'
Pueblo Rights
The San Fernando case also dealt extensively with the pueblo rights
doctrine. The pueblo rights doctrine gives a right to any city that can
trace its origins to a Spanish or Mexican land grant. All Spanish or
Mexican laws that existed prior to the annexation of California are the
law of the state, unless expressly amended or repealed.1 92 In addition,
187. Los Angeles v. San Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d 199, 283, 537 P.2d 1250, 1311, 123 Cal. Rptr.
1, 62 (1975).
188. Governor's Comm'n, supra note 171, at 34.
189. Los Angeles v. San Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d 199, 265, 537 P.2d 1250, 1298.
190. California Water Resources Center, Proceedings of the Tenth Biennial Conference on Ground
Water, 212 (1975).
191. Los Angeles v. San Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d 199, 265, 537 P.2d 1250, 1298, 123 Cal. Rptr.
1, 49 (1975).
192. Ohm v. San Francisco, 92 Cal. 437, 28 P. 580 (1891).
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the U.S. Supreme Court has
held that pueblo rights are a question of
93
state and not federal law.1
Pueblo rights have been called the "...
most litigated issue in the
history of water rights;' ' 94 the court first directed its attention to pueblo
rights in 1881.195 In the litigation dealing with pueblo rights prior to 1975,
two early cases are most often cited: Lux v. Haggin (Lux) 196 decided in
1886, and Vernon IrrigationCo. v. City ofLosAngeles (Vernon) 9 7 decided
in 1895.
Interestingly, the Lux case dealt with the pueblo right in dicta,'98 and
the Vernon case did not articulate any particular Spanish or Mexican law
establishing the right, but rather concluded that the right was implied
from the role assigned by the Spanish and Mexican governments to that
pueblo. These and other cases on pueblo rights led one long-time water
rights commentator to observe the following:
Thus this vitally important principle that has enabled great cities to
monopolize the entire flows of streams, regardless of water developments thereon by others . . . was added to the jurisprudence of
California as the result of a presumption.'
In the San Fernando case, at the trial level, the court spent months
establishing a record for the existence of a pueblo right in Spanish and
Mexican law." ° The lower c6urt concluded that a pueblo right could not
be found in Spanish or Mexican law and ruled against Los Angeles. The
supreme court concluded that the "case for the existence of the pueblo
right is essentially based on inferences from historical circumstances
rather than any express provisions of Spanish or Mexican law." 2"' The
court found that, although the data presented at trial did not conclusively
establish a basis in Spanish-Mexican law for the right, it also did not
conclusively establish its non-existence. Therefore, in light of the numerous cases that had upheld the right and considering the reliance the
City of Los Angeles had made on 20the
right in its water planning, the
2
court chose not to disturb the right.
Pueblo rights attach to all surface water serving the original pueblo
and to native groundwater that is hydrologically related to the surface
193. Los Angeles Farming & Mill Co. v. Los Angeles, 217 U.S. 217, 234 (1910).
194. MANN, supra note 14, at 209.
195. Feliz v. Los Angeles, 58 Cal. 73 (1881).
196. 69 Cal. 255, 4 P. 919 (1884).
197. 106 Cal. 237, 39 P. 762 (1895).
198. HUTCHINS, supra note 173, at 147.
199. Id., at 157.
200. California Water Resources, supra note 190, at 209.
201. Los Angeles v. San Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d 199, 232, 537 P.2d 1250, -,
123 Cal. Rptr.
1, 26 (1975).
202. Id., 14 Cal. 3d. 199, 251, 537 P.2d 1250, -. , 123 Cal. Rptr. 1, 35 (1975).
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water supply. Hence, in San Fernando, the City of Los Angeles was
found to have no right to groundwater in basins that were hydrologically
independent because of natural barriers.2°3

The right does not attach to non-native groundwater or water that has
been imported from outside and stored within the basin. Of particular
importance to the nature of the pueblo water right is its priority over other
rights and the amount of water that can be claimed under the right. Pueblo
rights are superior to riparian rights2" and the rights of appropriation.2 °5
The right is limited to that amount necessary to satisfy the municipal
needs of the city including annexed land outside the original boundaries
2° 6
of the pueblo. Hence, the right expands with the expansion of the city.
Finally, the right is not subject to loss by nonuse or statutory forfeiture. 20 7
Conjunctive Use
Conjunctive use is the coordinated operation of surface water reservoirs
and underground reservoirs so the total yield over a period of years
exceeds uncoordinated yield. Independent operation of surface or underground reservoirs designed to produce a long term safe and dependable
yield requires extraction rates roughly equal rates of replenishment. Conjunctive operation of surface and underground reservoirs allows for the
temporary overdrafting (i.e., extractions beyond safe yield) of surface
reservoirs during wet years and overdrafting of underground reservoirs
during dry years. The additional yield resulting from conjunctive management is obtained from saving water that might otherwise be wasted
during wet years from overflow and a reduced amount of evaporation.
The San Fernandodecision and an earlier case, Niles Sand and Gravel
Co. v. Alameda County Water District(Niles),°5 had a significant impact
on the ability of water purveyors to conjunctively manage surface and
groundwater sources. In the Niles case, the Alameda County Water District had been recharging the Niles Basin by percolation for storage purposes and to prevent salt water intrusion. The Niles Sand and Gravel
Company dug pits to a depth of 120-125 feet below the surface elevation
and 80-85 feet below the water table. To continue operations, the company was pumping and releasing roughly five million gallons of water
per day in San Francisco Bay.
The court found that, based on the statutory powers granted to the
203. Id., 14 Cal. 3d 199, 251, 537 P.2d 1250, -_, 123 Cal. Rptr. 1, 39 (1975).
204. Vernon Irrigation Co. v. Los Angeles, 106 Cal. 237, 39 P. 762 (1895).
205. Los Angeles v. Glendale, 23 Cal. 2d 68, 142 P.2d 289 (1943).
206. Los Angeles v. Pomeroy, 124 Cal. 597, 57 P. 585 (1899); Los Angeles v. Hunter, 156 Cal.
603, 105 P. 755 (1909); Los Angeles v. Glendale, 23 Cal. 2d 68, 142 P.2d 289 (1943); Los Angeles
v. San Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d 199, 252, 537 P.2d 1250, -,
123 Cal. Rptr. 1, 40 (1975).
207. Los Angeles v. Glendale, 23 Cal. 2d 68, 142 P.2d 289 (1943).
208. 37 Cal. App. 3d 924, 112 Cal. Rptr. 846 (1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1975).
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water district by the state and the doctrine of correlative rights, landowners
in the Niles Basin had a "public servitude" that imposed "such obligations
... limiting the use of lands lying in a particular geographical area,
where an overriding public interest requires it." 2' The right to enforce
the servitude is held by the district, and it limits overlying landowners'
rights to groundwater when such use interferes with a public groundwater
storage program. The court found the district had a right to store water
and to prevent others from extracting the water. The court further held
that the district was not liable for damage caused by flooding from storage
when water levels went no higher than their natural levels.2 1
In the San Fernando case, the court distinguished between native and
imported groundwater. The court found an importer of groundwater had
the right to recapture water either spread for storage or percolating back
into a basin after distribution. " ' The court based this ruling on an interpretation of Water Code Section 7075:
Water which has been appropriated may be turned into the channel
of another stream, mingled with its water, and then reclaimed; but
the water already appropriated by another shall not
in reclaiming .it
be diminished." 2
Citing City of Los Angeles v. City of Glendale,213 the court found the
statute to apply to groundwater storage. 1 4 In addition, the right to recapture was found to be of equal priority with pueblo rights and superior
21 5
to rights based on the ownership of overlying land or appropriation.
Concerning the recapture of delivered water, the court stated the following:
[T]he purpose of giving the right to recapture returns from delivered
imported water priority over overlying rights and rights based on
appropriations of the native ground supply is to credit the importer
with the fruits of his expenditures and endeavors in bringing into the
basin water that would not otherwise be there.21 6
During periods of basin surplus, importers cannot prevent appropriators
209. Id., 14 Cal. App. 3d. 924, 112 Cal. Rptr. 846, 853 (1974).
210. Id., 14 Cal. App. 3d. 924, 929, 935, 112 Cal. Rptr. 846, 849, 854 (1974). See also
Governor's Conn'n, supra note 171, at 67-68.
211. Los Angeles v. San Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d 199, 286, 537 P.2d 1250, 1313, 123 Cal. Rptr.
1, 64 (1975).
212. Id., 14 Cal. 3d. 199, 260, 537 P.2d 1250, 1295, 123 Cal. Rptr. 1, 46 (1975). See Cal.
Water Code § 7075 (West 1971).
213. 23 Cal. 2d 68, 142 P.2d 289 (1943).
214. Los Angeles v. San Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d 199, 260, 537 P.2d 1250, 1295, 123 Cal. Rptr.
1, 46 (1975).
215. Id., 14 Cal. 3d 199, 287, 537 P.2d 1250, 1314, 123 Cal. Rptr. 1, 65 (1975).
216. Id., 14 Cal. 3d 199, 260, 537 P.2d 1250, 1314, 123 Cal. Rptr. 1, 46 (1975).
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from making extractions if the importer has failed to recapture the imported water.2 1 7
Statutory Provisions in CaliforniaGroundwaterLaw
Article 10, Section 2 of the California Constitution states that:
the right to water or to the use or flow of water in or from any natural
stream or water course in this state is and shall be limited to such
water as shall be reasonably required for the beneficial use to be
served, and such right does not and shall not extend to the waste or
unreasonable use... 218
Although not specifically mentioned in the foregoing section, the Cal29
ifornia Supreme Court has found the provision to apply to groundwater.
As we have seen, the reasonable, beneficial use and avoidance of waste
requirements provide the broad outlines followed by the courts in adjudicating water rights. Various sections of the Water Code establish a
public interest in the use and development of groundwater and declare
for the state a right to regulate groundwater for public benefit and protection.220 Section 12922 of the code states that there is a public interest
in protecting groundwater basins from damage or impairment caused by
"overdraft, depletion, sea water intrusion or degraded water quality." 22'
The manifestations of these declarations of public interest in terms of
legislation to end overdrafting, regulate pumping and address other
groundwater problems has been sparse.
The Water Code provides for the inspection of "improperly constructed,
abandoned or defective wells" by the Department of Water Resources
(DWR), either independently or in conjunction with other governmental
units; authorizes the DWR to make recommendations for well construction
standards to the Regional Water Quality Control Boards (see below); and
"from time to time" report to the legislature recommendations for the
sealing of abandoned wells.222
Prior to commencing any digging or deepening of a well or prior to
the abandonment or destruction of a well, a permit must be obtained from
the DWR.22 3 After completion of the work, it is required that a report of
completion be filed with the DWR within 30 days. 224 Failure to obtain
the necessary permit or to file the report is a misdemeanor.2 z If the DWR
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.

Id., 14 Cal. 3d 199, 293, 537 P.2d 1250, 1318, 123 Cal. Rptr. 1, 69 (1975).
CAL. CONST. Art. 10, §2.
Peabody v. Vallejo, 2 Cal. 2d 351, 40 P.2d 486 (1935).
CAL. WATER CODE § 104, 105 (Derring 1977).
CAL. WATER CODE § 12922 (Derring 1977).
CAL. WATER CODE § 231 (Derring 1977).
CAL. WATER CODE § 13750 (Derring 1977).
CAL. WATER CODE § 13751 (Derring 1977).
CAL. WATER CODE § 13754 (Derring 1977).
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determines that standards are necessary for the construction, maintenance,
abandonment, and destruction of wells in a given area, it makes recommendations to the appropriate regional board and to the Department
of Health Services.226 After receiving a recommendation from the DWR,
the regional boards are required to hold a hearing on the proposed standards. Absent a recommendation, regional boards may hold hearings when
they have information that standards are necessary to protect water quality
in a groundwater basin.227 Upon determination that standards are necessary, the board must report those standards along with any standards
recommended
by the DWR to the county and cities within the affected
228
area.

Upon receipt of the regional boards' recommendations, the county or
city involved must promulgate, within 120 days, regulations establishing
the recommended standards. 229 These ordinances take effect in 60 days
unless the regional board finds the standards inadequate.2 3 If the standards
are inadequate, the county or city has 90 days to adopt new standards.
If the city or county fails to adopt or modify its standards within the
periods outlined above, the regional board is authorized to set standards
for the area. These standards take effect in 30 days. 3
Porter-Dolwig
In 1961, the legislature found that groundwater basins
are subject to critical conditions of overdraft, depletion, sea water
intrusion and degraded water quality causing great detriment to the
peace, health, safety and welfare of the people of the State. 2
The legislative response was the Porter-Dolwig Groundwater Basin Protection Law.233 Porter-Dolwig authorizes the DWR to study or investigate
projects that could protect groundwater and to review and evaluate plans
of any local agency that submits its groundwater protection plans to the
DWR. Any results from DWR studies are required under the law to be
sent to the State Water Resources Control Board (State Board) to be used
in formulating water quality standards.2 34 In 1967, the law was amended
to provide funding for studies "whenever money has been appropriated
for the purpose ....,235
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

CAL.
CAL.
CAL.
CAL.
CAL.
CAL.
CAL.
CAL.
CAL.
Id.
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WATER
WATER
WATER
WATER
WATER
WATER
WATER
WATER

CODE §
CODE §
CODE §
CODE §
CODE §
CODE §
CODE §
CODE §
CODE §

13800 (Derring 1977).
13801 (Derring 1977).
13802 (Derring 1977).
13803 (Derring 1977).
13804 (Derring 1977).
13805 (Derring 1977).
12922.1 (Derring 1977).
12920 et seq (Deering 1977).
12923 (Derring 1977).
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If the DWR recommends to the state board that action needs to be
taken to protect the quality of groundwater basins, the legislature has
granted the state board the right to bring suit in superior court to restrict
pumping or impose physical solutions. 3 6 In those cases, all groundwater
pumpers, except those extracting less than 10 acre-feet a year,237 are
named as defendants.238
Porter-Cologne
In 1969, the legislature passed the Porter-Cologne Water Quality Control Act to establish a statewide water quality control program administered on a regional basis.239 The act applies to both surface and
groundwater. 2' Under the act the state board has the responsibility, in
consultation with other governmental units, 241 of adopting state policy
for water quality control.242 Additional responsibilities include adopting
procedures for regional boards to follow when formulating water quality
control plans,243 distributing appropriated funds to regional boards for
their administrative costs, 2' doing annual evaluations of the need for
water quality research,245 and conducting research or coordinating research with other units of government or private organizations. 4 6
The nine regional water quality control boards are responsible, subject
to state board approval, for formulating and implementing water quality
control plans.2 47 These plans must, among other things, ". . . insure the
reasonable protection of beneficial uses and the prevention of nuisance.. .. I"4 The attorney general is authorized to enforce regional plans.
At the request of the regional board, the attorney general will seek a
restraining order or injunction from the superior court.249
Recordation Act
In 1955, the legislature found that, because of a "combination of light
rainfall, concentrated population, the transition of considerable areas of
land from agricultural use to urban use, and a similar dependence on
236.
237.
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CODE
CODE

§ 2100 (Derring 1977).
§ 2102 (Derring 1977).
§ 2100 (Derring 1977).
§ 13000 et seq (Deering 1977).
§ 13050(e) (Derring 1977).
§ 13144 (Derring 1977).
§ 13140(Derring 1977).
§ 13164 (Derring 1977).
§ 13168 (Derring 1977).
§ 13161 (Derring 1977).
§ 13162 (Derring 1977).
§ 13200, 13201, 13225 (Derring 1977).
§ 13244 (Derring 1977).
§ 13262 (Derring 1977).
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" the counties of Riverside, San Bernaground water supplies ... ,..
dino, Los Angeles, and Ventura would be subject to recordation requirements for groundwater extractions and diversions."' Individuals extracting
groundwater in excess of 25 acre-feet a year are required to file a "Notice
of Extraction and Diversion of Water" with the State Water Resources
Control Board. 52 The notice must contain the name of pumpers, location
and description of pump site, quantity of water pumped, and any additional facts the state board may deem appropriate. 3 Prescriptive rights
cannot be acquired unless a notice has been filed254 and, for legal purposes,
pumping without having filed notice is considered non-use.5 The willful
mistatement of facts in a notice is a misdemeanor. 6
The Recordation Act has allowed for a much more precise monitoring
of extractions in the four southern counties than had been possible in the
past. The act also makes it more difficult to acquire rights by prescription,
because prior right holders are in a better position to know when they
need to act to protect their rights.
From this summary of California statutory and case groundwater law
several things are clear. In parts of California where groundwater rights
have been adjudicated or water districts formed, the existing system of
water rights has allowed for the management of groundwater basins on
the local level to prevent overdrafting. Although the California Department of Water Resources has rather extensive powers to control groundwater pollution and can monitor extractions and new wells being put into
production, the state is powerless to control the rate of extraction. Hence,
California is a good example of a state with no experience with centralized
state administration of groundwater rights. New Mexico, in contrast, was
one of the first states to adopt a permit system for the extraction of
groundwater and, like Arizona, authority over groundwater pumping in
New Mexico is concentrated at the state level in the Office of the State
Engineer.

NEW MEXICO GROUNDWATER LAW
The New Mexico constitution establishes guidelines for the state's prior
appropriation doctrine. The constitution provides that beneficial use,
... shall be the basis, the measure and the limit of the right to use
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.

CAL. WATER CODE § 4999 (Derring 1977).
Id., Santa Barbara County was excluded in 1959.
CAL. WATER CODE § 5001 (Derring 1977).
CAL. WATER CODE § 5002 (Derring 1977).
CAL. WATER CODE § 5003 (Derring 1977).
CAL. WATER CODE § 5004 (Derring 1977).
CAL. WATER CODE § 5008 (Derring 1977).
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water; ' 257 water belongs to the public; anyone has a right to use unappropriated water subject to beneficial use; "priority of appropriation shall
give the better right." 25 ' Although not specifically mentioned in the constitution, subsequent statutory law z 9 and litigation 26 have extended the
principles of prior appropriation and beneficial use to groundwater law.
New Mexico's first groundwater appropriation statute, enacted in 1927,
gave the State Engineer supervision and control of groundwater and debelong to the public, and subject to approclared groundwater to "...
priation to beneficial uses. .. 26 In 1930, the New Mexico Supreme
Court found the 1927 act unconstitutional because of a technical error,
but upheld the principles and intent of the act.262
To correct these technical defects, the New Mexico legislature passed
a similar law in 1931.263 In 1950, the constitutionality of the 1931 act
was upheld. 2 ' Although there have been various amendments and additions to the 1931 act, it provides the basis for current groundwater law
in New Mexico.
Permit Procedure
Section 72-12-1 of the New Mexico sttautes is similar to parts of the
1927 and 1931 acts.
The waters of underground streams, channels, artesian basins, reservoirs, or lakes, having reasonably ascertainable boundaries, are
hereby declared to be public waters and to belong to the public and
to be subject to appropriation for beneficial use.265
Any individual or corporation (including municipal corporations) seeking to appropriate such waters must make an application to the State
Engineer. The application must include
... (1) the particular underground stream, channel, artesian basin,
reservoir, or lake from which water will be appropriated; (2) the
beneficial use to which the water will be applied; (3) the location of
the proposed well; (4) the name of the owner of the land on which.
the well will be located; (5) the amount of water applied for; (6) the
use for which the water is desired; and (7) if the use is for irrigation,
257. N.M. CONST. art. 16, §3.
258. Id. §2.
259. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-12-1 (1978).
260. State ex rel. Bliss v. Dority, 55 N.M. 12, 225 P.3d 1007 (1950). See also Flint, Groundwater
Law and Administration: A New Mexico View-point, 14 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 545 (1968).
261. N.M. Laws 1927, Ch. 182, § 1.
262. Yeo v. Tweedy, 34 N.M. 611, 286 P. 970 (1930).
263. N.M. Laws 1931, Ch. 131.
264. State ex. rel. Bliss v. Dority, 55 N.M. 12, 225 P.2d 1007 (1950).
265. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-12-1 (1978).
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the description of the land to be irrigated and the name of the owner
of the land." 6
If the application is for an appropriation on land not belonging to the
applicant, it must also include an acknowledged statement from the landowner granting access to the owner's land for purposes of drilling and
operating the well.267
Only waters within declared basins are subject to the application procedure. No permit or license is required to appropriate waters in nondeclared basins.268 Where there is no declared basin, the state engineer
has no jurisdiction over groundwater use. In these areas, individuals
claiming an infringement on their water rights must sue in district court.
In those suits, the burden of proof is on the senior appropriator to establish
a prior right and an infringement on his water right. 269 To date, 31 basins
had been declared by the state engineer, encompassing approximately
84,433 square miles of the state. 7 '
Section 72-12-25 prohibits the state engineer from declaring a basin
unless it has reasonably ascertainable boundaries, or if the top of an
aquifer is at a depth of 2,500 feet or more below the ground surface at
any well location and the aquifer contains nonpotable water. Nonpotable
is defined as water containing not less than one thousand parts per million
of dissolved solids.2 7 Parties drilling wells are required to file an intention
to drill with the state engineer and publish notice of their intention. These
wells may not be drilled until ten days after the last date of notice publication.272 Once an application has been filed for an appropriation in a
declared basin, the state engineer is required to publish notice in a newspaper of general circulation in the county of the proposed appropriation
for not less than once a week for three consecutive weeks. The notice
with the state
must indicate that objections to the application may be filed2 73
engineer within ten days after the last date of publication.
If no objections are filed and the state engineer finds there is unappropriated water in the basin or the proposed appropriation would not infringe
upon the water rights of prior appropriators, the application is approved
and a permit issued.274 The burden of proof is on the person seeking the
266. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-12-3 (1978).
267. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-12-3 (1978). The constitutionality of this provision was upheld in
City of Hobbs v. State ex. rel. Reynolds, 82 N.M. 102, 476 P.2d 500 (1970).
268. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-12-25 (1978).
269. Pecos Valley Artesian Conservancy District v. Peters, 52 N.M. 148, 193 P.2d 418 (1948).
270. New Mexico, State Engiener's Office.
271. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-12-25 (1978).
272. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-12-26 (1978).
273. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-12-3(D) (1978).
274. N.M. STAT. ANN. §72-12-3(E) (1978).
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appropriation to show that the appropriation will not interfere with existing
water rights.275
If objections have been filed to an application or if the state engineer
is of the opinion that the permit should be denied, the application may
be denied with or without a hearing.276 On occasion, the state engineer
will hold administrative conferences prior to hearings to determine the
issues between the parties.277 All decisions of the state engineer may be
appealed to the district court. 278 The appeal is by trial de novo,7 9 and the
district court is limited in its review to the evidence that was before the
state engineer. 211
Minor Appropriations
Section 72-12-1 of the New Mexico statutes directs the state engineer
to grant routinely permits for all applications for watering livestock,
irrigation of one acre or less of noncommercial trees, lawn or garden, or
for other household or domestic uses. The engineer is also directed to
issue permits for the extraction of up to three acre-feet per year for a
period of one year or less for prospecting, mining, constructing public
works and roads, or drilling to discover or develop mineral resources.
Those applications need not follow the ordinary permit procedure (outlined above) if they do not permanently impair any existing rights.2"'
Loss of Right
Section 72-18-8 of the New Mexico statutes provides for the revocation
of a permit issued by the state engineer and the loss of the appropriator's
water right. The section stipulates that, when for a period of four years
the owner of a permit does not put the water to the use for which the
permit was granted, after receiving notice from the state engineer, the
permit will be revoked. In such cases, the right to the water will revert
to the public and be subject to further appropriation.
Artesian Wells
Artesian waters in New Mexico water law are governed independently
from groundwater in general. A well that "derives its water supply from
any artesian statum or basin, ' is under the supervision and control of
275. McBee v. Reynolds, 74 N.M. 783, 399 P.2d 110 (1965); Heine v. Reynolds, 69 N.M. 398,
367 P.2d 708 (1962).
276. N.M. STAT. ANN. §72-12-3(F) (1978).
277. 1978-1980 N.M. ST. ENG. ANN. REPT. at 10.
278. 1976-1978 N.M. ST. ENG., THIRTY-THIRD BIENNIAL REPT. at 4.
279. N.M. CONST. art. 16, § 5.
280. C. M. Kelley v. Carlsbad Irrigation Dist., 71 N.m. 464, 394 P.2d 139 (1964).
281. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-12-1 (1978).
282. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-12-1 (1978).

July 1984]

GROUNDWATER RIGHTS

the state engineer, unless an artesian conservancy district has been formed
in which case the district has authority concurrent with that of the state
engineer. The owner of land on which an artesian well is located must
obtain a permit from the state engineer prior to any drilling, repairing,
abandoning, or plugging of the well.283 Contractors drilling within an
artesian basin or through an artesian stratum are required to keep records
of the work and file the records with the state engineer upon completion
of the drilling.'
The waste of artesian water is considered a misdemeanor and a public
nuisance. Either the state engineer or artesian conservancy district, ten
days after giving notice to the well owner of the nuisance, may correct
the nuisance and recoup the costs of the correction by attaching a lien
on the property.285 In addition, any transport of artesian water by ditch
or conduit which results in a loss of more than 20 percent of the water
prior to delivery is unlawful.286
Mine Dewatering
New Mexico contains fifty-two percent of the nation's known uranium
reserves.28 7 To tap those reserves, water must be pumped out of the
uranium-bearing rock and a shaft constructed through the aquifer. During
construction and after completion of the shaft, water is continually pumped
from the mine. The state engineer has estimated that mine dewatering in
New Mexico results in the discharge of between 40,000 and 50,000 acrefeet of water per year.288
Until 1980, the state engineer was powerless to regulate mine dewatering. In order to acquire a right to water and have that right subject to
the control of the state engineer, the water use must be beneficial and
located within a basin declared by the state engineer to have reasonably
ascertainable boundaries. Neither the courts nor the engineer considered
dewatering a beneficial use; consequently none of the aforementioned
groundwater statutes dealing with the appropriation permit process have
been applied tb dewatering" 9 and persons claiming an infringement of a
water right from dewatering have had to sue for an injunction in district
court.
283. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-13-4 (1978).
284. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-13-5 (1978).
285. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-13-8 (1978).
286. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-13-9 (1978).
287. U.S. Dept. of Interior, Bureau of Mines, 1 MINERALS YEARBOOK 1976, 1375 (1978).
288. S. E. Reynolds, Statement on Mine Dewatering to the Interim Legislative Committee on
Energy and Environment of the New Mexico Legislature (29 November 1979) as reported in New
Mexico's Mine DewateringAct: The Search For Rehoboth, 20 NAT. RES. J. 653, 655 (1980).
289. B. Stephenson and A. Utton, The Challenge of Mine Dewatering to Western Water Laws
and the New Mexico Response, 15 LAND AND WATER L. REV., 445, 453 (1980).
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Uranium companies have, in the past, found it in their interests not
have dewatering considered a beneficial use, because this declaration
would have given them the burden of proving the dewatering did not
infringe on the rights of prior appropriators. Mining companies frequently
need water for associated activities that constitute beneficial uses. Examples of these uses include sanitation and water for milling. When those
uses are involved, the state engineer has jurisdiction and the company
must apply for a permit. This type of application was filed by the Phillips
Uranium Company in September 1976. Phillips sought to withdraw an
average of 20,106 acre-feet per year for 32.5 years from the San Juan
Underground Water Basin.2"
After initially disapproving the permit on grounds the extraction would
infringe on existing rights in the basin, the state engineer held a hearing
and subsequently approved the application conditioned upon an allowable
decline of the basin's water level. The engineer's order stipulated that
extractions would have to stop within 365 days if the basin water level
declined by more than 400 feet. Estimates by Phillips found that, as a
result of Phillips extractions alone, a 400 foot drawdown would be reached
in seven years. 29'
The Phillips decision rendered the future of mining in New Mexico
uncertain. Absent assurance that dewatering sufficient to allow mining
would be allowed, the mining industry understandably would be reluctant
to invest large sums of capital in new mining operations. Because of this
uncertainty and the importance of the mining industry to the economy of
the state, the New Mexico legislature passed the "Mine Dewatering
Act."292 This act gives the state engineerjurisdiction over mine dewatering
in a declared groundwater basin. Anyone wishing to dewater must submit
an application to and receive a permit from the state engineer.2 93 If the
dewatering does not impair existing water rights, the permit will be
granted. If existing rights are impaired the permit will be denied, at which
time the applicant can appeal the engineer's decision or file a plan of
replacement.
The plan of replacement is perhaps the most significant innovation of
the act. Basically the plan of replacement is designed to protect the rights
of prior appropriators from any adverse effects of dewatering. Replacement may consist of
...the furnishings of a substitute water supply, the modification of
existing water supply facilities, the drilling of replacement wells, the
assumption of additional operating costs, the procurement of docu290.
291.
292.
293.

Id., at
Id., at
Senate
Id., at

471-472.
472-473.
Bill 114, 34th Legislature, State of New Mexico, Second Session (1980).
§ 6.
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mentation establishing a waiver of protection by owners of affected
water rights, artificial recharge or any other reasonable means to
avoid impairment. 219
The act requires the applicant to pay all replacement costs. 29 5 Upon
approval of the plan of replacement, the state engineer may issue a
dewatering permit contingent upon implementation of the plan. In the
event the owner of a prior water right feels the plan of replacement is
not being followed, he can file a notice with the state engineer detailing
the method or manner in which the permit holder has failed to implement
the plan of replacement. Upon the filing of a notice, the engineer may
hold a hearing and require the permit holder to show cause why the permit
should not be suspended or revoked.29 6
Critics have pointed to several potential flaws in the act,297 notably,
Section 5(B) of the act is a "grandfather clause" in that it exempts from
the act's provisions any mine dewatering initiated prior to the 5 March
1980 effective date of the act or any dewatering from a mine shaft under
construction prior to the effective date.298 In practical terms, this provision
means that the legal relationships between senior appropriators and firms
engaged in dewatering proir to the effective date remain unchanged. As
we have seen, these relationships have several disadvantages for senior
appropriators; notably, their only legal redress when their water rights
are being infringed is to seek an injunction in district court. They then
have the burden of proving infringement. Given what in most cases would
be the superior resources of defendant mining companies, plaintiffs in
those cases might find themselves at a serious disadvantage. The existence
of this grandfather clause and the resulting failure of the Act to address
conflicts from dewatering that began prior to the effective date of the act
played a large part in the decision of New Mexico environmental groups,
long advocates of dewatering regulations, not to support the act. 299
GroundwaterMining
In many western states, groundwater mining, or the extraction from
an aquifer at rates that exceed natural recharge, is prohibited. 3" Numerous
western states have reasonable pumping level statutes designed to regulate
294. Id., at § 2(D).
295. Id., at §4.
296. Id., at § 9(B).
297. See Stephenson and Utton, supra note 289, at 476 and New Mexico's Mine Dewatering
Act, supra note 288, at 665.
298. Senate Bill 114, supra note 292, at § 5(B).
299. Stephenson and Utton, supra note 289, at 476.
300. See e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-11 1(1)(b) (1973); IDAHO CODE §42-237a(g) (Supp.
1980); MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-506(2)(a), -507(4)(b) (1979); NEV. REV. STAT. § 534.110(6)

(1979).
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the rate of withdrawal in a given aquifer.30 ' New Mexico has no reasonable
pumping level statute.30 2
In Mathers v. Texaco, Inc.,303 the New Mexico Supreme Court approved
a management plan for the Lea County Underground Water Basin that
entailed controlled groundwater mining. The Lea County basin, for all
practical purposes, is non-rechargable. In 1952, the state engineer calculated the amount of water that could be withdrawn from the basin over
a 40-year period to leave approximately one third of the basin's water
remaining. On the basis of this calculation, the engineer granted to Texaco
a permit to appropriate 350 acre-feet a year from the basin. The court
accepted a number of facts including the non-rechargeability of the basin,
and it accepted the fact that the
appropriation of the water by Texaco will unquestionably lower the
water table ... will result in an increase in pumping costs and in
shortening the time during which the protestants can economically
pump water from their wells.30 4
The court rejected arguments that any lowering of the basin amounted to
an impairment of existing rights and found the engineer's management
plan an adeqauate method to insure for the public that
the maximum
30 5
beneficial use would be made for waters in the basin.
Relationship Between Ground and Surface Water Rights
The basic principles of New Mexico water law, i.e. prior appropriation
and beneficial use, apply to both ground and surface water. In both
instances, only a beneficial use of water can create a water right and any
unappropriated water
belongs to the public and is subject to appropriation
306
for beneficial use.
Frequently, surface water rights and groundwater rights are in conflict
as, for example, when groundwater extraction decreases available yield
from adjacent surface wter. The priority in right principle works in those
cases to protect the senior appropriator, whether he is an appropriator of
surface or of groundwater, against subsequent appropriations that infringe
30 7
upon his right, whether they are surface or groundwater appropriations.
In New Mexico, the leading case that illustrates this relationship and
the power of the state engineer to protect the rights of senior appropriators
301. See D. Grant, Reasonable Groundwater Pumping Levels Under the Appropriation Doctrine:
The Law and Underlying Economic Goals, 21 NAT. RES. J., 1-36 (1981).
302. Id., at p. 8. No dewatering plans have been approved to date.
303. 77 N.M. 239, 421 P.2d 771 (1966).
304. 77 N.M. 239 at 243, 421 P.2d at 774 (1966).
305. Id.
306. N.M. CONST. art. 16 §2.
307. Templeton v. Pecos Valley Artesian Conservancy District, 65 N.M. 59, 332 P.2d 465 (1959).
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is City of Albuquerque v. Reynolds." 8 In Albuquerque, the city applied
to the state engineer for a permit to appropriate groundwater from the
Rio Grande basin. Finding the basin fully appropriated and finding that
further extractions would result in an infringement on Rio Grande surface
rights, the engineer issued the permit contingent upon the city purchasing
and retiring existing surface rights to the Rio Grande in an amount necessary to offset the effects of the groundwater appropriation. The court
upheld the authority of the state engineer to make the contingency stating
the ". . . engineer adopted the only known plan to avoid impairment to
existing rights ...."309
Pueblo Water Rights in New Mexico
Although first recognized in California in 1881, the pueblo rights doctrine was not recognized in New Mexico until 1958 in Cartwright v.
Public Service Company ofNew Mexico.3 1 Prior to Cartwright,two New
Mexico Supreme Court cases found that Tularosa and Santa Fe did not
have pueblo rights.3 1' In neither case, as the court stated in Cartwright,
'
"..
was any position taken by the Court on the doctrine." 312
The Cartwright decision did not rest on an interpretation of Mexican
or Spanish law, but rather the court concluded that the rationale for
adoption of the doctrine articulated in the major California cases applied
with equal force to New Mexico. The decision cites the major California
cases and found that it was "unable to avoid the conclusion that the
reasons which brought the Supreme Court of California to uphold and
enforce the Pueblo Rights doctrine apply with as much force in New
'
Mexico as they do in California." 313
The pueblo right in question was that of the city of Las Vegas, New
Mexico, to the waters of the Gallinas River. Although Cartwright was
concerned with surface appropriations, the court did not distinguish between surface and groundwater, and the California cases the court followed apply to both sources.
As the preceding summary of the groundwater laws and administrative
procedures in Arizona, California, and New Mexico illustrates, there are
significant differences among the states in their groundwater laws, and
308.
309.
310.
311.
(1914)
(1937),
312.
313.

(1958).

71 N.M. 428, 379 P.2d 73 (1962).
City of Albuquerque v. Reynolds, 71 N.M. at 439-440, 379 P.2d at 81.
66 N.M. 64, 343 P.2d 654 (1958).
State ex rel. Community Ditches v. Tularosa Community Ditch, 19 N.M. 352, 143 P. 207
and New Mexico Products Co. v. New Mexico Power Co., 42 N.M. 311, 77 P.2d 634
the cities involved were Tularosa and Santa Fe respectively.
66 N.M. 64, 80-81, 343 P.2d 654 (1958).
Cartwright v. Public Service Company of New Mexico, 66 N.M. 64, 80, 343 P.2d 654
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type of groundwater regulation and level of centralized statewide control
over groundwater pumping.
New Mexico is a state with a long history of experience with a prior
appropriation and permit system administered in the Office of the State
Engineer. In most parts of the state (i.e. within declared basins), the
power of the New Mexico state engineer is extensive and includes determining beneficial uses, the extent of appropriation within a groundwater
basin, issuing permits for mine dewatering, determining rights between
surface and groundwater appropriators when these rights are in conflict,
and issuing permits for the mining of a groundwater basin.
California has had a long history of experience with the correlative
rights doctrine and no centralized control over groundwater use on the
state level. In those parts of California where groundwater rights have
been adjudicated or where water districts have been formed, the existing
system of water rights has allowed for the management of groundwater
basins on the local level to prevent overdrafting. State level authority
over groundwater pumping, vested in the California Department of Water
Resources, is limited to monitoring extractions and new wells being put
into production. The DWR is powerless to control rates of groundwater
extraction.
Arizona, a reasonable-use doctrine state, has vested significant powers
to control groundwater extractions in the state's most heavily-used
groundwater basins in a department of water resources. These powers
include the regulation of drilling permits and the manipulation of the
amount of groundwater that may be withdrawn for irrigation to bring the
state's most heavily overdrafted areas to a "steady state" or safe-yield
basis by the year 2025.
Interviews were conducted by the author with the leadership of interest
groups most active in groundwater matters in each state in an effort to
determine the attitudes of groundwater pumpers toward centralized administration of groundwater rights in general and their attitudes toward the
type of groundwater rights administrative system within their states. Interest group leaders were identified on the basis of interviews with employees of the Arizona and California Departments of Water Resources
and the New Mexico State Engineer's Office. In addition, during the
interviews with the interest group leaders so identified, the leaders themselves were asked to identify other groups active in groundwater matters
on the state level. From this procedure the following groups were identified as being the principal actors on groundwater matters on the state
level and their leadership interviewed." 4
314. Interviews conducted in New Mexico during May 1982, supra note 12.
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Arizona: the Agri-Business Council of Arizona; the Arizona Mining
Association; and the League of Arizona Cities and Towns.
California: the California Cattlemen's Association; the California
Chamber of Commerce; the California Farm Bureau; and the Association
of California Water Agencies.
New Mexico: the New Mexico Cattle Grower's Association; the New
Mexico Farm Bureau; the New Mexico Mining Association; the New
Mexico Oil and Gas Association; and the Public Service Company of
New Mexico.
Interviews were conducted during the month of December 1981 in
Arizona and March and May 1982 in California and New Mexico, respectively.
Group leaders were asked two series of open-ended questions. First,
group leaders were asked to evaluate the current system of groundwater
control and rights administration within their states. Then group leaders
were asked if they prefer that groundwater rights decisions be made on
the state or local level by a statewide agency or local entity, or if they
prefer water rights decisions be made by some other governmental entity
(e.g. the courts or the legislature) and why they held these opinions.
It was anticipated that given the dissimilar experience of the three states
in the study with types of groundwater laws and administrative systems,
the groundwater users, as represented by interest group leaders, would
have dissimilar attitudes toward types of administrative systems. The
interview findings are summarized below.
Interest Group Leaders' Attitudes
Arizona: Group leaders representing municipal and mining interests
in Arizona expressed satisfaction with the existing system of groundwater
rights. The agricultural representatives interviewed expressed dissatisfaction based primarily on a feeling that agriculture was forced to make
too many concessions to municipal and mining interests during the negotiations that led to the passage of the Groundwater Management Act.
All parties interviewed, however, felt it was too soon to determine how
effective the act would be and that their opinions could change depending
on how the act is implemented.
When asked about preferences for centralized statewide administration
of groundwater rights, no group reported a preference for statewide decisionmaking. The municipal and agricultural leaders interviewed indicated they would rather have disputes over groundwater rights settled by
the courts. The mining company representatives preferred that disputes
be handled by the state legislature. This lack of enthusiasm for administrative determination of groundwater rights had little to do with the
Arizona Groundwater Management Act but was, rather, based upon un-
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certainty as to how the Arizona Department of Water Resources would
implement the act.
California: Interestingly, in California all the groups surveyed expressed satisfaction and support for current groundwater law, and all also
said the status quo was ineffective in preventing overdrafting. None of
the interviewees in California expressed preference for statewide administration of groundwater rights. Only the group representing California
agricultural interests expressed a clear preference for using the courts.
The remaining interviewees indicated a preference for either the courts
or the state legislature depending on the issue involved. Without exception, the California groups surveyed tied their dislike of centralized administrtive water rights decision-making to the administration of then
California governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr. All respondents felt the Brown
administration was unsympathetic to their needs and that under a different
governor (and different gubernatorial appointees) they might prefer the
groundwater rights decisions be made by the California Department of
Water Resources.
New Mexico: The New Mexico groups interviewed were unanimous
in their support for the existing system of groundwater rights determination and in their support for centralized decision-making in the office
of the state engineer. Most respondents said they favored centralized
administration in New Mexico because of the uniformity and consistency
such administration provided. These comments were most strongly expressed by organizations whose operations are widely distributed throughout the state (i.e. the Farm Bureau, Cattle Growers, and the Public Service
Company). Several such respondents remarked that local control of
groundwater rights decisions would necessitate burdensome administrative costs and duplication of effort.
Without exception, however, approval of centralized administration in
New Mexico was tied to the New Mexico State Engineer, Steve Reynolds.
Laudatory comments about Reynolds included that he "has everybody's
respect," is "experienced and competent," "is very well qualified," and
"is fair.""' Furthermore, most respondents qualified their preference for
centralized administration by indicating their preference could change
quickly when Reynolds leaves office.
In summary, it was clear from the interviews that groups representing
groundwater pumpers are likely to be hostile to centralized administration.
These attitudes were evident from the interviews and, in the case of
California, from the opposition of the groups studied to Proposition 13
on the November 1982 California ballot-a measure that would have
significantly increased the authority of the Water Resources Control Board
315. Id.
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over groundwater regulation.3" 6 It was also clear that these attitudes had
less to do with any dislike for centralized administration per se, but were
closely associated with who would be administering those rights. Finally,
these attitudes were consistent regardless of the state's system of groundwater rights or history with centralized administration.
What significance can be attach to the attitudes of interest group leaders
in the three states in this study toward the centralized administration of
groundwater rights? Any state desiring to establish centralized coordination and/or administration of groundwater rights on the state level may
need to address concerns of groundwater pumpers about the consequences
of centralized administration prior to having any such plan meet with
success in the state legislature.31 7 From the experience of California, it
is clear that groundwater users will often have the political power necessary to thwart any unwanted attempt to rewrite the state's groundwater
laws.
In California, various attempts in the legislature to rewrite the state's
groundwater laws in a manner that would have significantly increased
the power of the Water Resources Control Board over groundwater management have been defeated, due largely to the opposition of the state's
major groundwater users to centralized control. 318 Furthermore, in Arizona, California, and New Mexico, the primary proponents of changes
in groundwater management practices have been environmental organizations.31 9 These groups are at a serious disadvantage vis-d-vis groundwater users in terms of the resources necessary to have influence in the
legislative process. These resources include financial backing, membership (both size and distribution), and access to technical information and
in-house expertise.320 In the face of opposition of groundwater users to
316. Smith, Z., Rewriting California Groundwater Law: Past Attempts and Prerequisitesto
Reform, 20 CAL. WEST. L. REV. 2 (1984).
317. Supra note 10 and accompanying text.
318. See Z. Smith, supra note 316. From 1978 to 1981 numerous bills were introduced in the
California legislature to implement the recommendations of the Governor's Commission to Review
California Water Rights Law. The recommendations would have empowered the State Water Resources Control Board to approve local management programs designed to curtail overdrafting. Three
of these bills, SB1505, AB442 and AB835, incorporated most of the major Commission recommendations. SB1505 was gutted to only require the Department of Water Resources to identify
groundwater basins in the state and identify those subject to critical conditions of overdraft. AB442
and AB835, after being heavily amended and having portions relating to groundwater management
deleted, nevertheless died in committee.
319. Id. Primarily the Sierra Club and also the Planning and Conservation League in California.
320. The resources of the groups in this study were determined through interviews and examination
of the campaign spending reports of each group on file in their respective state capitols. Without
exception the groups representing agricultural users were resource strong both in terms of membership
(the Arizona Agri-Business Council representing 800 individuals and 500 agricultural associations;
the New Mexico Farm Bureau and Cattle Growers having approximately 11,000 and 2,500 members
respectively; and the California Farm Bureau, Cattlemen's Association and Chamber of Commerce
having approximately 96,000 members, 11,000 members and 4,000 members respectively with the
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centralized administration of groundwater rights both in California and
elsewhere, 32 ' policymakers attempting to implement such a system may
want to take into consideration the attitudes of groundwater users toward
centralized administration. As we have seen in three states with widely
divergent experience with types of groundwater rights systems, groundwater users, as represented by interest groups concerned with the matter,
fear not centralized administration of groundwater rights but rather the
form that administration will take.

Chamber of Commerce having 385 local chapters and 150 trade association members) and in their
ability to make campaign contributions (all the agricultural groups or their members were found to
be frequent campaign contributors-amounts ran in the $100-$200 range in Arizona and New
Mexico, to the $1,000-$5,000 range in California). The extractive industry groups studied (i.e.
mineral and oil and gas producers) were also active campaign contributors. In addition, given the
importance of mining to the economies of Arizona and New Mexico and of agriculture to all three
states, we would expect their respective state legislatures to be responsive to the needs of these
industries. In contrast to the groundwater users, the environmental groups were found to be weak
both in terms of membership (ranging from a low of 1,500 members for the Planning and Conservation
League in California and 3,000 Sierra Club members in New Mexico to a high of 150,000 members
in the Sierra Club in California) and in the ability to make campaign contributions (only the California
Sierra Club reported making any campaign contribution--one $1,000 contribution in 1982). For a
discussion of the relationship of membership, campaign contributions, and other interest group
resources to legislative influence, see K. Beatty, H. Doerksen and J. Pierce, Water Resources Politics
and Interest Group Tactics, 14 WATER RES. BULL. 2, 399 (1978) and T. MOE, THE ORGANIZATION OF INTERESTS 52 (1980).
321. See supra note 10.

